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Immigration law and scholarship are pervasively organized around the 
principle that rules for selecting immigrants are (and should be) fundamentally 
different from rules that regulate the lives of immigrants outside the selection 
context.  Both courts and commentators generally conclude that the government 
should have considerably more leeway to adopt whatever selection rules it sees 
fit.  Consequently, the selection/regulation dichotomy shapes the central debates 
in immigration law—including debates about the legality and legitimacy of 
guest worker programs, America’s criminal deportation system, and restrictions 
on immigrant access to public benefits.  This Article argues that this central or-
ganizing principle is misguided:  legal rules cannot be classified as concerning 
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either selection or regulation because every rule concerns both.  Every rule that 
imposes duties on noncitizens imposes both selection pressure, potentially influ-
encing noncitizens’ decisions about whether to enter or depart the United States, 
and regulatory pressure, potentially influencing the way in which noncitizens 
who choose to stay live their lives.  Moreover, even if it were possible to overcome 
a century of radical disagreement about which rules are “really” about selection 
rather than regulation, there would still be little reason to ascribe constitutional 
or moral significance to the distinction between the two.  As the Article shows, 
selection and regulation are simply two alternative mechanisms that a state 
may use to achieve a particular end.  There is no a priori reason to prefer one 
mechanism over the other.  These central conclusions have a number of impor-
tant implications for immigration law and institutional design. 
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American immigration law is organized around a seductive idea:  
that rules for selecting immigrants are fundamentally different from 
rules regulating immigrants outside the selection context.  At bottom, 
the idea flows from the intuition that rules governing who gets to live in 
a state are, and should be, legally and morally distinct from other sorts 
of legal rules.  This intuition has long led courts to conclude that the 
2008] Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles 343
government has considerable leeway to adopt whatever selection rules 
it sees fit.  For example, rules that restrict the admission of immigrants 
on the basis of their speech are given great deference, but attempts to 
restrict the First Amendment rights of resident noncitizens would be 
subject to strict scrutiny.1  Outside the constitutional context, the dis-
tinction between selection rules and other rules frames debates about 
the legality and legitimacy of myriad laws that affect immigrants, in-
cluding guest worker programs, the criminal deportation system, and 
recent proposals for comprehensive immigration reform.2
This central distinction is misguided.  For over a century, every ef-
fort by courts and scholars to draw a conceptual distinction between 
immigrant-selecting rules and rules that affect immigrants’ behavior 
outside the selection context (immigrant-regulating rules) has been an 
utter failure.  These efforts have inevitably led to radical disagreement 
about how to classify any given rule.  The reason is not surprising:  legal 
rules cannot be classified as concerning either selection or regulation be-
cause every rule concerns both.  Every rule that imposes duties on non-
citizens imposes both selection pressure, potentially influencing non-
citizens’ decisions about whether to enter or depart the United States, 
and regulatory pressure, potentially influencing the way in which resi-
dent noncitizens live.  At a very basic level, these are the twin conse-
quences of any territorially bounded rule that imposes a duty on a per-
son.  Despite the fact that the distinction between selecting and 
regulating rules is part of the conceptual bedrock of immigration law, it 
is a foundation without substance. 
Recognizing that all immigrant-affecting rules have consequences 
for both selection and regulation has a number of important implica-
tions for immigration law and theory.  Fundamentally, it makes clear 
that we must reorganize debates about the legitimacy and constitu-
tionality of various immigration rules.  Legal rules cannot be mean-
ingfully defended simply by contending that they are part of the proc-
ess of selecting immigrants.  Nor can legal rules be criticized simply by 
casting them as surreptitious attempts to use putative immigrant-
selecting rules in order to regulate immigrants’ daily lives. 
Furthermore, even if we were able to get greater agreement by re-
formulating the dichotomy between selection rules and regulatory 
rules, there would still be little reason to treat the distinction as impor-
tant.  To be sure, sorting people across borders is meaningfully differ-
1 See infra text accompanying notes 23-24. 
2 See infra text accompanying notes 26-44. 
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ent from shaping peoples’ lives wherever they do choose to live.  These 
are two very different forms of behavior.  But even were we to ignore 
the fact that every legal rule produces incentives for both sorts of be-
havior, it is hard to see why we would treat the distinction between se-
lection and regulation as legally or morally significant.  Selection and 
regulation are simply alternative strategies for achieving whatever a 
state’s normative goals or constitutional commitments happen to be.  A 
state concerned about the cultural consequences of migration, for ex-
ample, can shape those consequences in two ways:  by altering the spa-
tial sorting of peoples across borders (perhaps to increase the cultural 
homogeneity of people who reside in the state), or by inculcating par-
ticular cultural views in those who do reside in the state. 
It would be a mistake to hold an a priori preference for either se-
lection mechanisms or regulatory mechanisms.  Neither has an inher-
ently positive or negative valence.  Rather, which mechanism is more 
effective or desirable in any particular context is an important (and 
overlooked) question of institutional design.3  Exploring this question 
will allow us to develop ways of evaluating immigrant-affecting rules 
that are analytically sharper and normatively more significant.  But 
these new analytic frameworks will not track the misleading distinction 
between selection rules and regulation rules that dominates immigra-
tion law today. 
In addition to this insight into the design of immigration regimes, 
the Article’s clearer conception of the relationship between selection 
and regulation has other important implications for the structure of 
immigration law.4  First, it demonstrates the central role that informa-
tion can play in immigration policy.  Second, it reorients modern de-
bates about immigration federalism by pointing to the fundamentally 
different types of sorting pressure created by state and federal rules.  
Third, it reveals the extent to which courts and commentators have 
overlooked a variety of options for structuring American deportation 
policy.
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I surveys several central 
debates in immigration law to show the prominent role played by the 
distinction between selection rules and regulatory rules.  Parts II and 
3 Of course, as this Article makes clear, it is never possible for a state to pursue a 
pure strategy of selection or a pure strategy of regulation because all legal rules will 
produce a mix of both consequences. 
4 See generally Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigra-
tion Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 811-12 (2007) (discussing the need for immigration 
scholarship to focus more on questions of institutional design). 
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III set out the Article’s core arguments:  first, that it may not be possi-
ble even to draw this distinction because efforts to employ it produce 
radical disagreement about how to categorize a wide swath of rules; 
and second, that even if it were possible to overcome this obstacle, 
there is no reason to treat the selection/regulation distinction as le-
gally or morally significant.  Part IV discusses a few implications for in-
stitutional design that follow from these conclusions. 
I. THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE OF IMMIGRATION LAW
To set the stage, this Part highlights the way in which immigration 
law and scholarship draw sharp conceptual, constitutional, and moral 
distinctions between rules that “select” immigrants and rules that 
regulate immigrants outside the “selection” context.  This dichotomy 
dominates most of the central controversies concerning immigration 
law and theory.  Part I focuses on three of the most prominent:  de-
bates about the scope of the federal government’s “plenary power” 
over immigration, disagreements over the boundaries and legal status 
of so-called “alienage law,” and conflicts concerning the power of state 
and local governments to regulate noncitizens. 
Before laying out these examples, it is useful to say a bit more 
about what I mean by the terms “selection” and “regulation.”  Part of 
the difficulty in defining these terms stems from the fact that they are 
never clearly defined by courts or commentators.  Instead, in existing 
discourse, the ideas of selection and regulation often seem to operate 
more as metaphors than as clear concepts.  But as I will show, there is 
an underlying account of selection and regulation that is central to all 
of the following examples.  Behind all of them is a rough sense that 
selection has to do with the process of sorting, while regulation has to 
do with the process of determining how immigrants residing in the 
United States live their lives.  For that reason, I will use the concept of 
“selection” to refer to spatial sorting for residency in a state.5  In con-
trast, I will use the concept of “regulation” to refer to the behavioral 
regulation of those who live within a state.6  It is, of course, possible to 
5 This use is intuitive and unsurprising given the fact that immigration law is cen-
trally concerned with the movement of persons across borders. 
6 This definition is necessarily a bit artificial.  “Regulation” is commonly used to 
capture all forms of behavioral regulation and thus could comfortably be understood 
to include even the regulation of sorting behavior.  For ease of exposition, however, I 
will use “regulation” as the obverse of “selection,” as this makes the two concepts ana-
lytically precise. 
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define these concepts slightly differently, but the above definitions 
best capture the dichotomy that organizes much of the case law and 
scholarship.  Moreover, Part II will return to the possibility that “selec-
tion” can be understood differently—as centrally concerned with 
ideas of membership rather than spatial sorting. 
A.  Constitutional Foundations and the Immigration “Plenary Power” 
The doctrine of “plenary power” is the most famous jurisprudential 
piece of American constitutional immigration law.  The doctrine has 
been at the center of some of the most controversial immigration cases 
decided over the last century, and it has prompted more legal scholar-
ship than perhaps any other aspect of immigration law.7  For present 
purposes, the plenary power doctrine is important because it is widely 
understood to draw a sharp constitutional distinction between rules 
that select immigrants and rules that otherwise regulate them. 
The Supreme Court first established the federal government’s 
plenary power over immigration matters in the late nineteenth cen-
tury.  To be sure, the history of the plenary power’s rise as a legal doc-
trine and an intellectual framework is complicated and contested.  
Nonetheless, two cases, decided just a few years apart, capture the 
plenary power’s foundational distinction between selection and regu-
lation that today shapes nearly all discussions about the structure of 
immigration law.  The first case concerned the legality of the Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882.8  In the years before the Act’s passage, Con-
gress faced increasing pressure to prevent Chinese immigration to the 
United States.  That pressure initially led Congress to enact the Page 
Act—the nation’s first restrictive immigrant admission law.9  The Page 
Act formally made prostitutes and some criminals inadmissible as im-
migrants; as a practical matter, the Act was applied selectively to ex-
7 For a small sample of this work, see sources cited infra note 13. 
8 Ch. 26, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943). 
9 See Ch. 141, § 1, 18 Stat. 477, 477 (1875) (repealed 1974) (restricting entry “of 
any subject of China, Japan, or any Oriental country” if the subject entered a contract 
for “lewd and immoral purposes”).  Prior to the passage of the Page Act, the federal 
government had never formally limited the admission of certain classes of potential 
immigrants.  This is not to say that there was no regulation of migration prior to this 
date. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1841-43 (1993) (examining state laws that had the effect of regu-
lating some migration during the nation’s first century).  But it was only in response to 
the growing backlash against Chinese immigrants that formal federal immigration con-
trols were finally introduced. 
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clude Chinese women.10  But just a few short years later, the Chinese 
Exclusion Act went much further:  it flatly prohibited the admission of 
all Chinese laborers.11
The Chinese Exclusion Act was quickly challenged as a violation of 
U.S. treaty obligations and the Constitution.  The Supreme Court up-
held the Act in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, concluding that the 
federal government has broad authority to regulate immigration free 
from federal courts’ interference.12  While the precise scope of the 
Court’s holding is more than a bit ambiguous, many courts and com-
mentators over the last century have concluded that it affirms the 
power of the federal government to select immigrants for admission 
on any basis—even on a basis, like race, that ordinarily would be sub-
ject to serious constitutional scrutiny.13  On this account, immigrant-
selecting rules are not constrained by ordinary constitutional law. 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins14 stands in stark contrast to Chae Chan Ping.  De-
cided just three years earlier, Yick Wo concerned the constitutionality 
of a San Francisco ordinance that prohibited laundries from operat-
ing in wooden buildings without a permit.  While the ordinance was 
facially neutral, it was applied in a discriminatory fashion:  permits 
were approved for laundries operated by white residents but uni-
formly refused for laundries operated by Chinese residents.15  The Su-
10 See Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 698-702 (2005). 
11 Chinese Exclusion Act § 1, 22 Stat. at 59 (suspending entry of Chinese laborers 
for ten years). 
12 130 U.S. 581, 604-10 (1889) (stating that the power to regulate immigration 
cannot be “restrained on behalf of any one” when exercised by the federal government 
in the interests of the country). 
13 For discussions of this constitutional exceptionalism, see GERALD L. NEUMAN,
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW
(1996); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold:  Race Discrimination and the Constitu-
tional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration 
Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255.  For a more 
recent example from the Supreme Court, consider Fiallo ex rel. Rodriguez v. Bell, 430 
U.S. 787 (1977).  In that case, the Court considered the constitutionality of an admis-
sion rule that facially discriminated on the basis of sex.  While the Supreme Court was 
beginning around that time to invalidate sex-discriminatory statutes in a variety of con-
texts, it declined to apply serious scrutiny to the admission policy.  Suggesting the ex-
ceptionalism of immigrant-selecting rules, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, 
noted that “over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more com-
plete than it is over the admission of aliens.  Our cases have long recognized the power 
to expel or exclude aliens as . . . largely immune from judicial control.”  Id. at 792 (ci-
tations and internal quotation marks omitted).   
14 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
15 Id. at 373-74. 
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preme Court invalidated the ordinance as a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Rather than following the path it was to take in 
Chae Chan Ping, the Court emphasized that the Equal Protection 
Clause covered “all persons” within the jurisdiction of the state.16  On 
that ground, the Court held that the government could not limit the 
employment opportunities of resident noncitizens on the basis of 
their race.17
Both Chae Chan Ping and Yick Wo involved laws that were racially 
discriminatory, but the Court treated those laws very differently.  There 
are a number of ways in which one might distinguish the cases.  One 
could rely on the territorial status of the petitioners:  Yick Wo was 
within U.S. territory, whereas Chae Chan Ping was excluded while at-
tempting to enter.18  Or one could interpret the cases as turning on the 
identity of the regulator:  Chae Chan Ping concerned a federal statute, 
while Yick Wo concerned a local ordinance.19  These explanations have 
played some role in the history of immigration law.  But both courts 
and commentators have often read the cases as turning on the type of 
rule at issue:  the question becomes whether the rule is an immigrant-
selecting rule.20  On this account, the Constitution accords the gov-
ernment greater flexibility when it selects immigrants than when it 
regulates the way that they live outside the selection context. 
The idea that the plenary power doctrine gives the federal gov-
ernment free rein in immigrant selection raises an immediate ques-
tion:  does selection extend beyond the decision to admit or exclude a 
noncitizen at the border?  The Court confronted this question not 
long after it decided Chae Chan Ping.  In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, it 
extended the idea of selection to encompass de-selection through de-
portation.21  The Court thus concluded that the government’s power to 
deport resident noncitizens was coextensive with its power to exclude 
16 See id. at 369. 
17 See id. at 369-74. 
18 For a discussion of the potential relevance of the status (territorial or otherwise) 
of the rights-claimant in immigration jurisprudence, see Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, 
Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 373, 388-92 (2004). 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 45-52. 
20 See, e.g., THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 
212 (6th ed. 2008) (asserting that “constitutional law relating to immigration may differ 
from [that] relating to noncitizen immigrants”); see also Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law 
and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625 (2007).   
21 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
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them at the border.22  Later cases suggested that, as a result, deporta-
tion policies would be subject to less scrutiny than other policies relat-
ing to noncitizens.  For example, a long line of cases makes clear that 
the government may not criminally punish noncitizens for engaging in 
disfavored speech.23  In contrast, other Supreme Court decisions have 
been read to suggest that the government may be able to select immi-
grants for deportation on the basis of whether they have engaged in 
disfavored speech.24  While there are many ways one might try to rec-
oncile the holdings of these lines of cases, courts commonly reconcile 
them by concluding that rules relating to immigrant selection 
(through deportation) are subject to significantly less scrutiny than 
rules relating to immigrant regulation (through criminal sanction). 
To be sure, the question of the plenary power’s scope over immi-
grant selection is not always answered in the same way.  Many legal 
scholars and judges have criticized the Supreme Court for classifying 
all deportation laws as immigrant-selecting rules.25  Consider, for ex-
22 See id. at 707 (“The right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners, who have not 
been naturalized or taken any steps toward becoming citizens of the country, rests 
upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and 
prevent their entrance into the country.”). 
23 See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (“Freedom of speech and of 
press is accorded aliens residing in this country.” (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 
252, 263 (1941))). 
24 See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491-92 
(1999) (“When an alien’s continuing presence in this country is in violation of the 
immigration laws, the Government does not offend the Constitution by deporting him 
for the additional reason that it believes him to be a member of an organization that 
supports terrorist activity.”); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 551 n.15 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that immigration laws require deportation of 
aliens who advocate overthrowing the government by force).  Relatedly, modern im-
migration law appears to make persons deportable for mere membership in disfavored 
organizations—though mere membership by a resident noncitizen in a disfavored or-
ganization, such as the Communist Party, cannot, as a constitutional matter, be crimi-
nally sanctioned.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (2006) (making deportable any non-
citizen who is a member of a terrorist organization described in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)). 
25 Justice Murphy’s famous concurrence in Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 157-66 
(1945) (Murphy, J., concurring) is but one example.  That case concerned deportation 
for membership in the Communist Party.  In the course of concluding that the depor-
tation statute violated the First Amendment, Murphy argued that such a deportation 
rule should not be insulated by the plenary power for two reasons.  First, he argued 
that the Constitution protected all persons within the territory of the United States.  Id.
at 161-62.  Second, and more important for present purposes, he argued that the dis-
tinction between selection and regulatory rules was illusory:   
Any other conclusion [than that the First Amendment applied] would make 
our constitutional safeguards transitory and discriminatory in nature. Thus 
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ample, Daniel Kanstroom’s recent critique of the structure of the 
modern deportation system.26  He contrasts modern deportation rules 
with the rules that existed at the turn of the twentieth century.  On his 
account, deportation was historically used only to remove people who 
had sneaked through the border-exclusion system.27  In contrast, the 
government today uses the deportation system to remove people for a 
variety of post-entry conduct—most notably, a wide range of criminal 
conduct.28  Kanstroom suggests that the original deportation system 
was less worrisome because it was an inevitable part of the process of 
selecting immigrants:  we selected immigrants at the border, and de-
portation was a mechanism for ensuring that those who slipped 
through the cracks of the selection system were not permitted to re-
main in the country.29  Kanstroom argues that the deportation system 
has become increasingly illegitimate in the modern era because it is 
no longer used solely as part of this selection system.  Instead, it has 
morphed into a system of “social control”—that is, a system that regu-
lates the daily lives of those noncitizens who live in the United States 
by sanctioning (with deportation) certain post-entry conduct they 
might undertake.30
While both Kanstroom and the courts rely crucially on the distinc-
tion between immigrant-selecting rules and immigrant-regulating 
rules, they wield the distinction in crucially different ways.  The Su-
preme Court suggests that it considers a rule criminally sanctioning an 
immigrant for engaging in particular conduct to be a regulatory rule, 
                                                                                                                               
the Government would be precluded from enjoining or imprisoning an alien 
for exercising his freedom of speech.  But the Government at the same time 
would be free, from a constitutional standpoint, to deport him for exercising 
that very same freedom. 
Id. at 162. 
26 See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HIS-
TORY (2007). 
27 See id. at 4-6, 91-130. 
28 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (listing grounds of deportability). 
29 See KANSTROOM, supra note 26, at 5-6 (suggesting that “extended border con-
trol” laws, in contrast with “post-entry social control” laws, are legitimately derived from 
sovereignty). 
30 See id. at 5-6, 10-12, 107-30, 243 (cataloging various forms of post-entry social-
control deportation implemented by the federal government).  To be sure, Kanstroom 
is displeased with the use of deportation in all its forms, including as “extended border 
control.”  But he sees that type of deportation rule as conceptually distinct from, and 
less egregious than, the use of deportation as “social control.”  See id. at 243 (“As a 100-
plus years social experiment, the U.S. deportation system has caused considerable 
harm and done little demonstrable good. . . . The dramatic recent increase in post-
entry social control deportation warrants special concern.”). 
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but that it considers a rule deporting an immigrant for engaging in 
the very same conduct to be a selection rule.31  Kanstroom, on the 
other hand, argues that many deportation rules should be classified as 
regulatory rules, not selection rules.32  In other words, the Court and 
Kanstroom rely on the same organizing principle to reach opposite 
conclusions:  the Court to justify considerable deference to deporta-
tion rules, Kanstroom to argue for much more scrutiny of (at least 
some) deportation rules.  Clearly they have different ideas about what 
distinguishes the two types of rules and where precisely the boundary 
falls between the two types.  But they share a common conceptual 
framework for resolving questions about the legality or legitimacy of 
immigrant-affecting rules. 
B. Immigration Law and “Alienage” Law 
The legal debate about which rules concern immigrant selection 
ranges well beyond the ambit of admission and deportation rules.  
What are commonly referred to as “alienage” rules are often analyzed 
in the same terms.  Alienage laws are rules that treat a person differ-
ently because of her citizenship status.33  These include laws that pro-
hibit noncitizens from receiving public assistance,34 working in par-
ticular occupations,35 participating in politics,36 and so on.  Alienage 
rules may apply to all noncitizens, or they may target only a subclass of 
noncitizens, such as noncitizens who are in the country unlawfully.  
Recent state laws denying undocumented immigrants access to a vari-
ety of public services are an example of the latter sort of restriction.37
31 See supra text accompanying notes 21-23 (discussing this reading of Fong Yue 
Ting and contrasting criminal cases). 
32 See KANSTROOM, supra note 26 at 18 (“We therefore shall not view deportation 
law solely as an adjunct to sovereignty or as merely part of the immigration border con-
trol system.”). 
33 See, e.g., ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 20, at 1191. 
34 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611–1613, 1621–1622, 1631–1632 (2006) (limiting lawful 
permanent residents’ access to public assistance). 
35 See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 444-47 (1982) (discussing permis-
sible employment restrictions on lawful permanent residents); ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra
note 20, at 360-96 (discussing employment restrictions on temporary migrants). 
36 See, e.g., ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 65-67, 82-87 (2000) (describ-
ing the development of restrictions on voting by noncitizens); NEUMAN, supra note 13, 
at 70-71 (same). 
37 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-140.01 (2005) (requiring verification of im-
migration status for public benefits and classifying nondisclosure of violations of fed-
eral immigration law by a state employee as a misdemeanor); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-
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Courts have struggled for decades to develop a coherent ap-
proach to evaluating alienage rules.  For the most part they have 
failed:  in some cases courts have suggested that alienage classifica-
tions are suspect and trigger heightened scrutiny,38 but in other cases 
courts have suggested that some alienage restrictions are due great 
judicial deference.39  For all the doctrinal confusion, however, a con-
sistent thread is that courts often frame their reasoning in terms of 
the dichotomy between immigrant selection and regulation:  they of-
ten suggest that the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny turns on 
whether particular alienage rules do or do not relate to the process of 
immigrant selection.40
Scholars also often use this intellectual framework for evaluating 
restrictions on resident noncitizens.  For example, Hiroshi Motomura 
has recently argued that the United States needs to reconceive the ba-
sic structure of immigration law. (Like Kanstroom, he believes such a 
reformulation is needed to recapture the earlier promise of the sys-
tem, which he worries has been lost in the modern era.)  His central 
thesis is built on a conceptual framework that distinguishes sharply be-
tween the selection and regulation of immigrants.41  Motomura argues 
that the United States may be free to choose immigrants on a variety 
of bases, but that we have a moral obligation to treat as equals the 
immigrants we choose as “citizens-in-waiting”—that is, we have an ob-
                                                                                                                               
76.5-103 (2007) (mandating verification of lawful presence for adults applying for lo-
cal, state, or federal benefits); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-36-1 (2006) (same as Colorado). 
38 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (“[T]he Court’s de-
cisions have established that classifications based on alienage . . . are inherently suspect 
and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”). 
39 See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976) (“The reasons that preclude 
judicial review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of deci-
sions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturaliza-
tion.” (footnote omitted)). 
40 See, e.g., id. at 81 (noting the increased judicial deference to the federal gov-
ernment for regulating immigration and naturalization); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 
351, 358 n.6 (1976) (noting that state law cannot interfere with the federal power to 
regulate immigration); Richardson, 403 U.S. at 377 (noting the national government’s 
“broad constitutional power” to regulate the terms and conditions of naturalization); 
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786-87 (C.D. Cal. 
1995) (holding that several provisions of California Proposition 187 were unconstitu-
tional because “the authority to regulate immigration belongs exclusively to the federal 
government”). 
41 HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING 13, 189-200 (2006) [hereinafter 
MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING]; cf. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, 
Federalism and Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 202-03 (1994) (recognizing some 
tension between the categories of immigration rules and alienage rules, but still relying 
on this organizing distinction). 
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ligation to regulate their lives as residents no differently than we regu-
late the lives of citizens.  He gives numerous examples of what this 
might mean in practice.  Under his model of immigration law, the 
government should be free to choose not to admit immigrants who 
might be at risk of becoming public charges; for example, the gov-
ernment might choose to permit immigration only by highly skilled 
immigrants who have substantial savings.42  But the government 
should not be free to make immigrants ineligible for public assistance 
that is available to citizens.43  The reason for this distinction, he sug-
gests, is that the former context involves immigrant selection, but the 
latter involves a decision about how to treat already-selected immi-
grants.44
C. Immigration Federalism 
Immigration federalism is a third area in which the distinction be-
tween immigrant-selecting rules and other rules has long framed legal 
debates.  The relationship between state and federal power over non-
citizens has been an issue for nearly two centuries.  Power struggles 
between the national government and immigrant-receiving states like 
New York and California are part of what gave rise to the plenary 
power doctrine in the nineteenth century.45  More recently, the explo-
sion of state and local efforts to regulate noncitizens has been front-
page news.  Several states and dozens of local governments have en-
acted laws relating to noncitizens in the past few years.46  These laws 
run the gamut from restrictions on access to public benefits, to provi-
sions penalizing employers who hire immigrants without work au-
thorization, to statutes permitting local law enforcement officials to 
arrest and detain individuals for immigration violations.47
42 Cf. MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING, supra note 41, at 191 (suggesting that 
groups can demand that new members meet higher standards than some current 
members).   
43 See id. at 190-91.   
44 See id. at 191. 
45 See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1875) (striking down a California 
statute requiring ship masters to pay bonds for certain categories of immigrants arriving 
on their vessels); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 269-71 (1875) (striking 
down a similar New York statute); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 410 
(1849) (holding that a state tax imposed on arriving noncitizens was unconstitutional). 
46 See Migration Policy Inst., State and Local Immigration Regulation, http:// 
www.migrationinformation.org/integration/regulation.cfm (last visited Nov. 15, 2008) 
(cataloging recent state and local regulatory efforts). 
47 See id.
354 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 341
Courts have been deeply divided over which sorts of rules states 
have the power to pass.  Despite these disagreements, however, courts 
share a common approach to the cases:  they widely agree that the 
Constitution reserves to the federal government the exclusive power 
to select immigrants.48  Thus, courts generally concur that states can 
regulate immigrants only outside of the selection context.49
The recent high-profile judgment striking down Hazleton, Penn-
sylvania’s attempt to regulate immigrants exemplifies this common 
approach.50  Hazleton had adopted an ordinance similar to those en-
acted by many other local governments:  the ordinance empowered 
local officials to penalize business owners who hired unauthorized 
workers as well as landlords who rented to unauthorized immigrants.51
In striking down the ordinance, the district court emphasized that 
Hazleton was attempting to set selection priorities different from 
those of the federal government.52  Thus, the court concluded, the 
48 See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (“Federal authority to regulate 
the status of aliens derives from . . . the Federal Government’s power ‘[t]o establish [a] 
uniform Rule of Naturalization’ . . . .” (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 4)); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941) (“[T]he supremacy of the 
national power . . . over immigration, naturalization, and deportation, is made clear by 
the Constitution . . . .”); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889) 
(stating that the power to prohibit immigration is reserved to the federal government); 
Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he regulation of 
immigration is unquestionably an exclusive federal power . . . .”), overruled on other 
grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999); cf. Ariz. Con-
tractors Ass’n v. Candelaria, 634 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1048 (D. Ariz. 2008) (noting that 
immigration has historically been an exclusive federal concern).  See generally Clare 
Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 
807-26 (2008) (summarizing the claim of federal exclusivity over immigration regula-
tion); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 567, 575-76 (2008) (surveying Supreme Court treatment of federal ex-
clusivity); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry?  Devolution of the Immigration Power, 
Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 501-04 (2001) (arguing in favor 
of federal exclusivity).   
49 See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 
757, 764-65 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (“The Supreme Court has held that state immigration 
laws can be preempted by federal law in several ways. . . . Under the first test, the Court 
must determine whether a state statute is a regulation of immigration.  Since the power to 
regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power, any statute statute 
which regulates immigration is constitutionally prescribed.” (emphasis added)).
50 See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 533 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (holding 
that the Hazleton ordinance was preempted by federal law and thus unconstitutional). 
51 See id. at 515-17 (describing the tenant-registration ordinance and amendments). 
52 See id. at 530-32 (concluding that the Hazelton ordinance attempted to make de 
facto de-selection decisions about many immigrants whom the federal government had 
allowed to remain in the United States). 
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ordinance was preempted by various provisions of the federal immi-
gration code and by Congress’s exclusive authority over immigration. 
The Hazelton court’s approach is far from unusual.  Constitutional 
questions concerning immigration federalism have long been organ-
ized around the selection/regulation dichotomy.  Consider Truax v. 
Raich, an early–twentieth century case in which the Supreme Court in-
validated an Arizona law prohibiting most businesses from employing 
more than a certain percentage of noncitizens.53  The Court treated 
the rule as beyond the state’s power on the ground that it amounted 
to a de facto selection rule: 
The authority to control immigration—to admit or to exclude aliens—is 
vested solely in the federal government.  The assertion of an authority to 
deny to aliens the opportunity of earning a livelihood when lawfully ad-
mitted to the State would be tantamount to the assertion of the right to 
deny them entrance and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot live 
where they cannot work.54
Many other cases take a similar approach, casting rules burdening 
noncitizens as implicit limitations on entrance.55  But this does not 
mean that there is agreement about how to treat such rules; far from 
it.  Court and commentators disagree pervasively about whether such 
rules should or should not be considered selection rules.  Recently, 
for example, lower courts considering local ordinances almost identi-
cal to Hazelton’s have reached opposite conclusions about whether 
those ordinances should be considered selection rules.56
53 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
54 Id. at 42 (citation omitted). 
55 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378-79 (1971) (“The state statutes 
at issue in the instant cases impose auxiliary burdens upon the entrance or residence 
of aliens who suffer the distress, after entry, of economic dependence on public assis-
tance.  Alien residency requirements for welfare benefits necessarily operate . . . to dis-
courage entry into or continued residency in the State.” (emphasis added)); id. at 379-80 
(“[I]n the ordinary case an alien, becoming indigent and unable to work, will be un-
able to live where, because of discriminatory denial of public assistance, he cannot ‘se-
cure the necessities of life, including food, clothing, and shelter.’  State alien residency 
requirements that either deny welfare benefits to noncitizens or condition them on 
longtime residency, equate with the assertion of a right, inconsistent with federal pol-
icy, to deny entrance and abode.”); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 
419 (1948)(redescribing  a state rule that precluded some noncitizens from obtaining 
commercial fishing licenses as a “discriminatory burden[] upon the entrance or resi-
dence of aliens,” a rule beyond the power of a state because a state “can neither add to 
or take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission”).
56 Compare Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 
757, 768-69 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (concluding, like the Hazelton court, that a local ordi-
nance prohibiting landlords from leasing to those without “eligible immigration status” 
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In short, immigration federalism questions have the same analytic 
structure as plenary power doctrine and alienage-law jurisprudence.  
To be sure, the consequences of concluding that a rule is a selection 
rule are different here from in the first two doctrinal areas.  There the 
conclusions insulated government action from judicial review; here 
the conclusion strips states of the power to enact a particular rule.  
The common intellectual framework, however, remains. 
*      *      * 
The three central areas of immigration jurisprudence laid out 
above all follow the same basic analytic structure:  in each, important 
legal or moral principles are thought to follow from the distinction 
between rules that select immigrants and rules that regulate immi-
grants’ lives outside the selection context.  In the plenary power ex-
amples, the Court refuses to scrutinize rules that it identifies as selec-
tion rules—even where those rules appear to single people out for 
unfavorable treatment on the basis of their race or speech, grounds 
which would ordinarily raise constitutional suspicion.  But the Court 
appears much more willing to intervene where it concludes that the 
rule is not a selection rule. 
Similarly, Motomura and Kanstroom both rely on a strong distinc-
tion between selection rules and regulatory rules to frame their cri-
tiques of contemporary immigration law and policy.  Kanstroom criti-
cizes the modern deportation system on the ground that it has strayed 
from its selection-focused roots and taken on the ambition of regulat-
ing immigrants’ lives outside the selection context.  Motomura’s ar-
gument is broader, but it is framed by the same idea.  He argues that 
while the United States should have considerable leeway to select im-
migrants on a wide variety of bases, it should consider those immi-
grants it selects citizens-in-waiting, and accordingly treat them basi-
cally as existing citizens.  On that basis, he concludes that most of our 
existing immigrant employment restrictions, immigrant voting rules, 
deportation rules, rules restricting immigrant access to public assis-
tance, and so on are misguided.  For Motomura, these rules are not 
                                                                                                                               
does amount to “a regulation of immigration”—in other words, that it is an immigrant-
selecting rule), with Garrett v. City of Escondito, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1055-56 (S.D. 
Cal. 2006) (concluding that a local ordinance prohibiting any person from harboring 
an illegal immigrant in a dwelling unit “does not attempt to impermissibly regulate 
immigration” because it does not amount “essentially [to] a determination of who 
should or should not be admitted to the country”).
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selection rules; they are rules that regulate immigrants outside the se-
lection context.  Yet the rules do not treat immigrants as citizens are 
treated, and for that reason are unjustified. 
While the examples all make use of a similar conceptual frame-
work, this similarity masks deep disagreements.  Courts are often con-
flicted about which legal rules concern immigrant selection—with the 
end result being a relatively incoherent doctrine concerning the scope 
of the immigration plenary power, the boundaries of alienage law, 
and the shape of immigration federalism.  Moreover, even where 
there is relative judicial agreement about which rules concern selec-
tion, scholars often sharply disagree.  Of course, the existence of these 
disagreements is well known.  A good chunk of modern immigration 
law scholarship focuses, either directly or indirectly, on differences of 
opinion about the appropriate location of the line between immi-
grant-selecting and immigrant-regulating rules.57  These disagree-
ments have led scholars like Kanstroom to criticize the Court for locat-
ing the line in the wrong place.58  More generally, they have led many 
to expend considerable effort trying to figure out which rules are ap-
propriately put in which conceptual box. 
II. THE MISLEADING DISTINCTION BETWEEN SELECTION RULES
AND REGULATORY RULES
To defend immigration law and scholarship’s central focus on the 
distinction between rules that select immigrants and rules that regu-
late immigrants outside the selection context, we would need first, to 
give an account of what courts and commentators mean by selection; 
second, to explain how one should distinguish between rules that are 
selection rules and other rules; and third, to explain why dividing up 
legal rules in this fashion serves some useful purpose—in other words, 
why it is a useful way of protecting particular constitutional values, 
promoting certain normative commitments, thinking about the insti-
tutional design of immigration systems, and so on. 
This Part explains why efforts to determine whether a particular 
legal rule does or does not constitute an immigrant-selecting rule have 
been such a failure.  The difficulty is not that there is no clear concep-
57 See, e.g., MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING, supra note 41, at 113-14; Victor C. 
Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied:  Rethinking Equal Protection Review of Federal 
Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 76 OR. L. REV. 425, 452 
(1997).
58 See KANSTROOM, supra note 26, at 243-46. 
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tion of selection.  Underlying all of the examples in Part I is a rough 
sense that selection has to do with spatial sorting for residence in a 
state, while regulation covers all other nonsorting forms of behavior.  
The problem crops up in the effort to determine whether a particular 
legal rule does or does not constitute an immigrant-selecting rule.  
Legal rules can be classified in a variety of ways, but, as the examples 
in Part I show, courts and commentators focus centrally (and unsur-
prisingly) on the material consequences of legal rules relating to im-
migrants.  They try to divide immigrant-affecting rules into two mutu-
ally exclusive categories in the following fashion:  immigrant-selecting 
rules are those that affect spatial sorting, and immigrant-regulating 
rules are those that affect the way that noncitizens live outside the 
sorting context.59  Part II.A demonstrates that this effort is doomed to 
fail because every territorially bounded rule produces both selection 
pressure and regulatory pressure.  As a result, even sophisticated 
commentators will often disagree, radically, about whether a given 
rule constitutes a selecting rule or instead a regulating rule.  Part II.B 
shows that attempts to decrease disagreement by conceptualizing the 
distinction in some other way—by focusing on the facial features of 
the legal rules, or on their underlying purpose or public meaning—
are unlikely to be successful.  Nor, as Part II.C explains, can radical 
disagreement be avoided by reconceptualizing selection as concerned 
with the idea of membership rather than spatial sorting.
Before proceeding, I should note one important caveat:  I do not 
mean to suggest that there are no analytically straightforward distinc-
tions that we might draw between rules that regulate noncitizens.  My 
point is only that such distinctions do not track any of the existing at-
tempts to separate selection rules from regulatory rules.  Consider, for 
example, a simple territorial distinction.  We might evaluate immigra-
tion rules differently depending on whether they legally coerce immi-
grants who are inside or outside the physical territory of the state.60  It 
59 It is on this basis, for example, that Kanstroom argues that many deportation 
rules should be treated as immigrant-regulating rules:  these deportation rules are 
really regulatory rules, he says, because they affect the way in which noncitizens live in 
the United States.  See supra text accompanying notes 26-30. 
60 Territoriality is not, of course, the only analytically straightforward alternative.  
Another possibility is the distinction between ex ante and ex post screening–-on mak-
ing decisions about an immigrant’s right to reside on the basis of information that the 
state has at the time the immigrant arrives, or instead on the basis of information that 
arises some time after the immigrant enters.  Here too it is not hard to see how rules 
could be uncontroversially classified as embodying ex ante or ex post screening.  
Moreover, in other work, Eric Posner and I have explained why the distinction be-
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is possible that there would be relatively widespread agreement about 
how to apply this conceptual distinction.61  Moreover, there are a 
number of theories in American constitutional law about why territo-
riality might be normatively significant.  But the idea of territoriality 
does not track anything like the distinction between selection and 
regulation that exists in immigration law today.  At a basic analytic 
level, the territorial distinction focuses on the status of the noncitizen 
subject to a particular legal rule; in contrast, the selection/regulation 
dichotomy focuses on the status of the legal rule itself.  This funda-
mental difference has long led courts and commentators to treat the 
territorial distinction as entirely separate from the distinction between 
selection and regulation rules.  This is why there are huge disagree-
ments over whether a rule that makes someone deportable for criticiz-
ing the government, or a local law that forbids landlords from renting 
to undocumented noncitizens, should be considered a selection or a 
regulation rule.62  Despite the fact that these are clearly rules operat-
ing against noncitizens who are within the territory, the question re-
mains whether they are selection rules precisely because immigration 
law does not treat the task of classifying a rule as selecting or regulat-
ing as turning on the status of the noncitizen.63
                                                                                                                               
tween ex ante and ex post rules is extremely significant for any effort to evaluate the 
structure of immigration law.  See Cox & Posner, supra note 4.  Again, however, this dis-
tinction does not track anything like the distinction between selection and regulation. 
61  That said, even this distinction presents two thorny conceptual issues.  First, it 
requires a conception of what it means to be within the territory of a state.  The devel-
opment of the entry fiction in immigration law and recent disagreements about the 
territorial status of places like Guantanamo Bay should remind us that the concept of 
territorial presence can still produce its share of disagreement. Compare Rasul v. Bush, 
542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004) (“By the express terms of its agreement with Cuba, the 
United States exercises complete jurisdiction and control over the Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Base, and may continue to exercise such control permanently if it so chooses.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)), with id. at 497 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]oday's 
opinion . . . extends the habeas statute, for the first time, to aliens held beyond the 
sovereign territory of the United States and beyond the territorial jurisdiction of its 
courts.”).  Second, the territorial distinction requires a conception of what it means for 
a legal rule to “apply to” or “legally coerce” a person.  Rules that exclude noncitizens at 
the border clearly apply to them, but those same rules also often have profound effects 
for those already living within the territory.  See Cox, supra note 18 (discussing the con-
sequences of admission rules for those who are territorially present); see also infra text 
accompanying note 123.  This complicates the question whether such rules should be 
thought of as applying to persons within or to persons outside the territory. 
62 See supra Part I (discussing the widespread disagreement about how to classify 
such legal rules). 
63 Note that this point is true for any conceptual distinction that turns on the 
status of the noncitizen—even if the relevant marker of status is not territoriality.  
Thus, my point applies mutatis mutandus if we deem a person’s legal admission into 
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In short, my argument is that the dominant distinction between 
immigrant-selecting rules and other rules is unhelpful and misleading 
in two respects.  First, as this Part explains, attempts to apply such a 
distinction produce widespread disagreement, even by those quite 
knowledgeable about immigration law—suggesting that the distinc-
tion is in fact incoherent.64  Second, as Part III shows, even if we might 
be able to reach greater agreement under certain formulations of the 
distinction, it is difficult to see why the fact that a rule is or is not con-
sidered a selection rule should be given much normative or legal sig-
nificance.  For these reasons, the central reliance on the distinction 
often leads courts and scholars astray in arguments about the legal or 
moral structure of immigration law. 
A.  Choosing Where to Live and How to Live 
Efforts to classify a particular legal rule as either an immigrant-
selecting rule or an immigrant-regulating rule will inevitably fail.  
Every putative selection rule creates regulatory pressure (that is, pres-
sure to live one’s life in a particular way), and every putative regula-
tory rule creates selection pressure (that is, pressure to live in a par-
ticular place).  In fact, any legal rule that one might apply to 
noncitizens will create both selection and regulatory pressure.  These 
twin pressures simply describe the two different ways in which poten-
tial or actual immigrants might respond to a legal rule imposed by a 
state.  From the immigrant’s perspective, therefore, every legal rule 
imposing an obligation, duty, or burden imposes both types of pres-
sures.  And from the state’s perspective, the distinction between so-
called selection rules and regulatory rules quickly breaks down as the 
rules emerge as (at least partial) functional substitutes.  Thus, immi-
gration law and scholarship is wrong to place such emphasis on our 
ability to divide legal rules into these two categories. 
To see this basic conceptual point about the twin consequences of 
immigrant-affecting rules, consider what might initially appear to be 
archetypical selection rules:  admission and deportation rules.  These 
                                                                                                                               
the United States as the relevant determinant of status, rather than their entrance into 
the physical territory (which could be with or without legal permission).  All such 
status-based arguments about the structure of immigration law share the fundamental 
similarity of focusing on some aspect or characteristic of the noncitizen.  But the cen-
tral point of Part I was to show that, as a descriptive matter, such status-based theories 
cannot explain wide swaths of immigration law. 
64 Thus, I am not simply making a claim about the imprecision of legal categories 
generally, about the difference between rules and standards, or about the distinction 
between hard and easy cases. 
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rules provide that an immigrant can reside in a state if certain condi-
tions do obtain and other conditions do not obtain.  In U.S. immigra-
tion law, such rules are commonplace, and the conditions that deter-
mine an immigrant’s right to reside are varied:  immigrants gain the 
right to reside on the basis of conditions like family connections (such 
as marriage) and employment prospects, and admission on many of 
these grounds is numerically limited by quotas.65  Immigrants lose 
their right to reside in the United States if they commit certain crimes, 
if they provide material support to a designated terrorist organization, 
and so on.66
Perhaps unsurprisingly, admission and deportation rules are those 
rules that both courts and scholars have most commonly identified as 
selection rules.  In reality, however, admission and deportation rules 
also operate as immigrant-regulating rules by generating powerful in-
centives for immigrants to live their lives in particular ways.  The 
criminal deportation rules in the United States illustrate this effect.  
Noncitizens in the United States become deportable if, among other 
things, they are convicted of an “aggravated felony.”67  Ex post, such a 
conviction can lead to a noncitizen’s deselection from residence in 
the United States.  Ex ante, however, the possibility of deportation for 
such a conviction creates pressure for a resident noncitizen to avoid 
committing crimes classified as aggravated felonies.68  Questions re-
main, of course, about how large this incentive is and how responsive 
each immigrant is to the incentive.  But at a basic behavioral level, it is 
impossible to disentangle the selection and regulatory effects of the 
rule.  The rule cannot be recast to have only selection features without 
corresponding consequences for the daily lives of immigrants. 
Moreover, this conclusion is not an artifact of my choosing, as an 
example, a rule that makes a person deportable for post-entry con-
duct.  Kanstroom’s book suggests that this choice is significant and 
that deportation rules triggered by post-entry conduct amount to dis-
65 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151–1160 (2006) (describing grounds of admission and nu-
merical limitations).  See generally ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMI-
GRATION POLICY IN THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA (2006) (surveying the historical de-
velopment of America’s admission system). 
66 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (describing grounds of deportability). 
67 Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
68 Note that, ex ante, such a rule also creates selection pressure.  The existence of 
criminal deportation provisions can affect the decisions that potential immigrants 
make about whether to come to the United States.  For example, the risk of erroneous 
deportation on the basis of the criminal provision could discourage risk-averse nonciti-
zens from immigrating. 
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guised forms of social control.69  Kanstroom is correct that such rules 
create incentives that might shape immigrant behavior.  But he is 
wrong to suggest that other sorts of deportation rules would not have 
a similar effect. 
Deportation rules—that is, rules that result in a person’s removal at 
some point after they initially enter the United States—can be divided 
into two categories:  rules that rely on information available at the time 
the immigrant enters (ex ante information rules) and rules that rely on 
information that arises after the immigrant enters (ex post information 
rules).70  The criminal deportation rules are the latter sort.  The immi-
grant’s post-entry conduct provides new information on which the de-
portation is based.71  The former sort would include rules that make an 
immigrant deportable on the ground that she entered the country 
without being admitted or that she lied on her admissions applica-
tion.72  Kanstroom suggests that these ex ante deportation rules do not 
operate as mechanisms of social control in the way that ex post depor-
tation rules do because they do not turn formally on post-entry con-
duct.  But this is incorrect.  Ex ante deportation rules can also produce 
powerful immigrant-regulating effects.  For example, many immigrants 
in the United States today are here without authorization because they 
entered the country surreptitiously.  But the immigration provision 
that makes them deportable on the basis of this ex ante information 
still changes how these immigrants live their lives.  The threat of dis-
covery and deportation shapes the choices they make about where to 
live, whether to travel outside the country, when to interact with gov-
ernmental officials, and so on.73
69 See KANSTROOM, supra note 26, at 4-6. 
70 For a discussion of the choice between ex ante and ex post screening rules, see 
Cox & Posner, supra note 4. 
71 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (describing the classes of crimes resulting in deport-
ability). 
72 See id. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (making inadmissible—and hence subject to re-
moval—any “alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled”); id.
at § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (making inadmissible—and hence subject to removal—any non-
citizen who procured admission “by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact”). 
73 It is tempting to think that there is an exception to this logic:  one might argue 
that deportation can affect the daily lives and behavior of immigrants only to the ex-
tent that the noncitizens can affect the risk of deportation by changing their behavior.  
Thus, one might argue, pure status-based reasons for removal cannot produce the 
same pressure for an immigrant to change her behavior.  The explanation of deporta-
tion based on unlawful status belies this argument.  And the same is true for other 
status-based removals.  So, for example, even deportation based solely on an immi-
grant’s race can create incentives for the immigrant to act in particular ways, even 
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Even if we limit our focus exclusively to admission and exclusion 
at the border and put aside all deportation rules, it is still impossible 
to untangle cleanly the selection and regulation effects of immigra-
tion rules.74  The rules that determine whether a noncitizen should be 
admitted or excluded at the border still regulate immigrants by shap-
ing how they live, not just where they live.  A noncitizen facing an 
American admission rule that privileges migrants who will work in a 
particular industry might choose to pursue a career in the United 
States in that industry in order to secure the immigration benefit, 
even if the immigrant otherwise would have preferred a different pro-
fession.  And even before the point of entry, potential migrants’ deci-
sions about education,75 marriage,76 and a variety of other matters are 
shaped by the admission rules of other states. 
So much for archetypical selection rules.  What about rules that are 
more likely to be thought of as immigrant-regulating rules, rather than 
                                                                                                                               
though she cannot change her race (in any conventional sense).  See generally KENJI YO-
SHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006) (discussing so-
cietal pressure to conform even immutable characteristics such as sexuality and race). 
74 Rather than restricting the set of putative selection rules on the basis of the in-
formation used for the selection decision, this restriction is based on the timing of the 
selection decision.  For a discussion of these twin dimensions of rules that regulate 
immigrants’ rights to reside in a state, see Cox & Posner, supra note 4. 
75 See ROBERT E.B. LUCAS, SWED. MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL 
MIGRATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
(2005) (discussing educational choices of Filipino students as a means of gaining ad-
mission to the United States); Michel Beine et al., Skilled Migration and Human Capi-
tal Formation 13-15 (Nov. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
web.econ.uic.edu/espe2007/paper/D13.pdf (providing some empirical evidence that 
the admission rules in receiving states influence the education decisions of potential 
migrants in sending states).  Cf. Mari Kangasniemi et al., Is the Medical Brain Drain 
Beneficial?  Evidence from Overseas Doctors in the UK (Feb. 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0618.pdf (surveying 
Indian doctors working in the United Kingdom and determining that only a minority 
of doctors from developing countries considered the possibility of migration when they 
chose to obtain medical degrees). 
76 One interesting recent example comes from Denmark.  In 2002, Denmark 
changed its family-reunification grounds for immigration.  Prior to that point, a non-
citizen living in another country could obtain an immigrant visa if she married an im-
migrant living in Denmark.  After July 1, 2002, a family-reunification visa was not avail-
able if one of the marriage partners was below twenty-four years of age.  The change 
was designed to reduce the number of arranged marriages and to reduce the number 
of nonwestern immigrants entering Denmark.  A recent study finds, perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, that the change in admission rules altered the marriage behavior of immigrants 
and their potential spouses. See Helena Skyt Nielsen et al., The Effect of Marriage on Edu-
cation of Immigrants:  Evidence from a Policy Reform Restricting Spouse Import (Inst. for the 
Study of Labor Discussion Paper Series No. 2899, 2007), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1000373. 
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immigrant-selecting rules?  Consider a hypothetical legal rule that im-
poses a burden on all noncitizens who reside in a state because of their 
status as noncitizens.  Such rules are common in the United States.  
Immigrants who come to the United States face a variety of restrictions 
on their employment opportunities, on their access to public assis-
tance, on their ability to participate in politics, and so on.77  These are 
the rules sometimes thought of as immigrant-regulating rules. 
In operation, these putative immigrant-regulating rules create 
substantial selection pressure:  they can affect decisions about whether 
to migrate in the first place or whether to stay if one has already mi-
grated.78  This result follows because immigrants can respond in two 
ways to a rule that imposes a burden or a duty on them.  First, they 
can accept the burden or comply with the duty.  Second, they can 
leave the jurisdiction in order to escape the application of the burden 
or the duty.  Take employment restrictions, for example.  If the 
United States limits the employment opportunities for highly skilled 
migrants (by, for example, making it difficult for these immigrants to 
change jobs79), a noncitizen working in Silicon Valley has two choices:  
put up with the job restriction despite the fact that it limits her oppor-
tunities or leave the United States in order to avoid the job restriction.  
A noncitizen thinking about immigrating to the United States faces a 
similar choice.  She can come and accept the burden, or she can 
choose not to come—either by not migrating at all, or (and this is an 
77 See supra text accompanying notes 33-36. 
78 This does not mean, of course, that all migrants will respond to the selection 
pressure imposed by such a rule by altering their migration decisions.  There are many 
reasons why such a rule might not affect a particular noncitizen.  First, and most 
straightforwardly, the benefits from migration might be so great that the burden does 
not dissuade the immigrant from migrating (in other words, the immigrant might be 
inframarginal rather than marginal).  Second, the immigrant might not have complete 
information about the existence of the rule or its consequences at the time she makes 
her migration decision.  (I return to this point in Part IV.A.)  Third, the immigrant 
might, for a variety of cognitive reasons, be overly optimistic about the benefits of mi-
gration or the significance of the rule’s burden.  These possibilities suggest a number 
of reasons why, as a matter of institutional design, such rules could have consequences 
far different from those that a state might intend or for which it might hope.  For ex-
ample, they suggest that some regulatory efforts might well not be effective or might 
not be worth their cost given the actual decision-making process of potential migrants.  
This is an important point, as the small economics literature on the institutional de-
sign of immigration systems generally overlooks many of these possibilities by assuming 
an overly simplistic model of immigrant decision making. 
79 See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(n) (2006) (placing some limits on the job flexibility of 
highly skilled workers in the country on temporary employment visas).  
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increasingly important possibility) by migrating to another country 
that does not impose a similar burden.80
*      *      * 
In short, therefore, every legal rule relating to noncitizens can af-
fect both where they live and how they live in that place.  This connec-
tion between so-called immigrant-selecting and immigrant-regulating 
rules is occasionally noted by courts and scholars, but it is recognized 
only sporadically and usually in the service of arguing for the need to 
keep the two categories of immigrant regulation separate.  In other 
words, various legal actors often view any slippage between the con-
ceptual categories as an undesirable anomaly.81  But this is a mistake, 
as the interrelationship is an inevitable feature of any rule that im-
poses a burden on an immigrant.82
80 See, e.g., Ayelet Shachar, The Race for Talent:  Highly Skilled Migrants and Competi-
tive Immigration Regimes, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148, 149-61 (2006) (discussing how the de-
mand for highly skilled migrants can shape the immigration policies of countries 
competing for those migrants).  Note that even legal rules that do not target nonciti-
zens, such as tax policies or redistribution policies, can produce selection effects by 
altering potential migrants’ decisions about where to live in the world.  See, e.g., Jef-
frey Grogger & Gordon H. Hanson, Income Maximization and the Sorting of Emi-
grants Across Destinations 21-25 (Feb. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/~ies/Spring07/HansonPaper.pdf (presenting some em-
pirical evidence that more progressive social policies tend to reduce the average skill 
level of immigrants). 
81 See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY 
MEMBERSHIP 37-76 (2006) [hereinafter BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN]; 
KANSTROOM, supra note 26, at 5-6, 10-12, 124-30 (describing the difference between de-
portation as a tool for “extended border control” and “social control”); MOTOMURA,
AMERICANS IN WAITING, supra note 41, at 189-91, 194-200, 203-04; Linda Bosniak, Member-
ship, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1053-57 (1994) 
[hereinafter Bosniak, Membership] (highlighting the relationship between immigration 
and alienage law). 
82 In this way, legal scholarship concerning immigration is somewhat discon-
nected from the way that social scientists talk about rules that regulate immigrants.  
For example, the sparse economics literature on the institutional design of immigra-
tion systems treats the deep behavioral connection between selection effects and 
regulatory effects as a foundational premise, and for that reason, draws essentially no 
distinction between so-called selection rules and regulatory rules.  See, e.g.,
Mohammad Amin & Aaditya Mattoo, Can Guest Worker Schemes Reduce Illegal Immigra-
tion? 3-4 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3828, 2006), available at
http://econ.worldbank.org (search “Data & Research” for “3828”) (finding that 
guest-worker schemes are an inefficient way to combat illegal migration); Grogger & 
Hanson, supra note 80, at 21-25, 28-34; Karen Heimbüchel & Oliver Lorz, Temporary 
Immigration Visas 2-3 (Feb. 23, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=964858 (examining the economic effects of issuing tempo-
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Moreover, it is important to recognize that my argument is simply 
an application of a more foundational point about the consequences 
of all legal rules that have limited jurisdictional scope.  Such rules al-
ways operate both as sorting mechanisms and as behavior-regulating 
mechanisms.  This point is well understood in many other areas of 
law.  Within local-government scholarship, for example, a large litera-
ture focuses on the ways in which local-government policies might af-
fect people’s decisions about where to live (and reciprocally, how the 
mobility of people might affect the policies that local governments 
adopt).83  The same is true with respect to corporate law:  the idea that 
the structure of corporate law is in part the product of interjurisdic-
tional competition for incorporations is common.84  Strangely, how-
ever, this basic point is too often overlooked in immigration jurispru-
dence and scholarship, even though immigration law is centrally 
concerned with the spatial sorting of peoples across state boundaries. 
B. Rescuing the Dichotomy? 
That every jurisdictionally bounded legal rule produces both se-
lection and regulatory effects does not mean that it is logically impos-
sible to draw a distinction between immigrant-selecting and immi-
grant-regulating rules.  But as the examples in Part I suggest, attempts 
to draw this distinction over the last century have led to radical dis-
agreement about which rules are properly classified as immigrant se-
lecting and which are properly classified as immigrant regulating.  
This confusion and incoherence is driven in large part by the fact that 
                                                                                                                               
rary visas to foreign nationals).  Similarly, the sociological literature on the ways in 
which legal structures affect migration patterns also treats both types of rules as sub-
stitute mechanisms that each have effects on migration patterns.  See, e.g., DOUGLAS S.
MASSEY ET AL., WORLDS IN MOTION: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AT 
THE END OF THE MILLENIUM 270-74, 288-89 (1998). 
83 This literature was spawned in part by Charles Tiebout’s seminal article on the 
provision of local public goods.  Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,
64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
84 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 600-07 (2003) 
(proposing that Delaware competes not only with other states, but also with the federal 
government, for corporate tax revenue); Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Char-
ters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 844-46 (1993) (discussing 
how state takeover regulation affects competition among states).  There are many other 
analogs that do not involve spatial sorting.  In democratic theory, for example, scholars 
often focus on two intertwined consequences of electoral rules:  (1) the rules’ selection 
effects (i.e., the effects on the types of representatives selected), and (2) the rules’ behav-
ioral effects (i.e., the effects on the behavior of office-holders).  Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Es-
say, Selection Effects in Constitutional Law, 91 VA. L. REV. 953, 995-98 (2005) (discussing the 
structure of constitutional law from these twin perspectives). 
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the legal categories have been thought of as mutually exclusive even 
though the sorting and regulatory consequences of immigrant-
affecting rules are deeply intertwined.  But whatever the precise cause, 
my modest point is that it is a mistake to attach great legal or moral 
significance to a legal dichotomy that has been largely incoherent in 
practice. 
Note two features of this claim:  First, it is not just a claim about 
the inevitable fuzziness of all legal categories, or about the distinction 
between hard and easy cases.  As the examples in Part I illustrate, even 
the core, archetypical cases in the field produce deep disagreement 
and doctrinal incoherence.  Recall the discussion of deportation rules.  
Some conclude that these rules are in the heartland of what must be 
considered selection rules if anything is to be given that moniker.  But 
others argue vigorously that, to the contrary, most deportation rules 
are “really” immigrant-regulating rules that amount to the social con-
trol of resident noncitizens.  Second, the descriptive claim laid out 
above is not an unusual one in law.  There are other areas in which 
legal categories have, in practice, turned out to be impossible to apply 
in any coherent way.  Standing law’s injury-in-fact requirement is just 
one among many famous examples. 
Still, one might argue that it is possible to rescue the conceptual 
distinction from incoherence.  First, we might do so by becoming re-
lentlessly empirical.  Not all putative selection and regulation rules are 
perfect substitutes.  The extent to which they are substitutes depends 
on a variety of factors, including how much information immigrants 
have about the legal rules, how much those immigrants value living in 
the United States, and how effectively the government enforces a par-
ticular rule.85  To the extent that they are not perfect substitutes, some 
rules will produce greater selection effects while others will produce 
greater regulatory effects.  Perhaps rules can be classified on the basis 
of their predominant effect.  This might allow us to reach greater 
agreement about the distinction.  But the resulting distinction would 
not come anywhere close to tracking the existing structure of immi-
gration law.86  And as I will show in Part III, determining the causal ef-
85 See supra note 74. 
86 This causal focus would radically reshape immigration law because the pre-
dominant consequences of an immigrant-affecting rule will often not track any of the 
existing intuitions in doctrine or scholarship about which rules are selection rules and 
which are regulatory rules.  This is the central thrust of Part II.A.  And it is easy to 
imagine myriad examples not included in that discussion.  For example, the immigra-
tion code excludes those who lack certain vaccinations, and many would describe this 
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fects of any particular rule will still not justify drawing a sharp norma-
tive distinction between selection rules and regulatory rules. 
Relatedly, one might argue that we can avoid incoherence if we 
stop focusing on the material consequences of legal rules relating to 
noncitizens.  Perhaps the legal and moral status of those rules should 
depend on something else.  This is not an unfamiliar idea.  In Ameri-
can constitutional law, for example, the legal status of a particular rule 
often appears to turn on the facial content of the rule or the reasons 
underlying the rule, rather than on the rule’s material conse-
quences.87  But it is not clear that such a focus would make it easier to 
reach agreement about how to categorize a particular rule.  More im-
portantly, it is not clear why a facial or purpose-based distinction 
should carry legal or normative significance. 
Consider the idea of facial targeting first.  On this understanding, 
we might conclude that rules stating “no noncitizen without a college 
education shall be admitted” or “any noncitizen convicted of a crime 
shall be deported” are selection rules, while rules stating “noncitizens 
are ineligible for public assistance” or “noncitizens are barred from 
government employment” are regulatory rules.  But is this intuition 
meaningful?  After all, every putative regulatory rule can be reformu-
lated to have identical content but to look like a putative selection 
rule.  For example, we can redescribe the rule “noncitizens are ineli-
gible for public assistance” as “noncitizens can enter (or remain) only 
                                                                                                                               
as an archetypical selection rule.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).  Contrary to 
that intuition, however, it is quite possible that this rule has only a tiny effect on who 
actually comes to the United States but a substantial behavioral effect, causing large 
numbers of people to be vaccinated who otherwise would not be.  In contrast, consider 
a rule that many might classify as regulatory:  the post-9/11 regulations that required 
many noncitizens from predominantly Muslim countries to specially register with the 
FBI. See Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Countries, 68 
Fed. Reg. 8046 (Feb. 19, 2003); 68 Fed. Reg. 2363 ( Jan. 16, 2003); 67 Fed. Reg. 77,642 
(Dec. 18, 2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 77,136 (Dec. 16, 2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 70,526 (Nov. 22, 
2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 67,766 (Nov. 6, 2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 57,032 (Sept. 6, 2002); see also 8 
U.S.C. § 1303(a) (authorizing the Attorney General to prescribe special registration 
for certain classes of aliens).  It is quite possible that this rule had a much greater effect 
on where noncitizens chose to live than on how they lived, as the rule may have 
prompted many noncitizens either to leave or not to enter the United States out of 
disgust for the program’s singling out of noncitizens from predominantly Muslim 
countries. 
87 See generally Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules:  The Moral Structure of Ameri-
can Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1998); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. 
Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law:  A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); 
David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 
(1989).
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on the condition that they agree not to receive public assistance.”88
Thus, even on this approach, which might seem to be the easiest (if 
most limited) way to distinguish between rules that select and rules 
that regulate, there will often be considerable disagreement about 
how to classify a particular rule.89
Beyond this conceptual point, there is the question why this sort 
of facial distinction should be accorded great normative or legal sig-
nificance (a point about which I will say more in Part III).  The same 
is true for a purpose-based distinction between immigrant-selecting 
and immigrant-regulating rules.  Law often focuses on reasons for ac-
tion rather than just material consequences.  Purpose-based tests of 
constitutionality are perhaps the most obvious example of this sort of 
focus.90  It is important not to overlook such theories.  Still, however 
88 The functional identity of these two rules makes all the more startling the fact 
that much immigration law and scholarship suggest that they should be subject to dif-
ferent sorts of scrutiny. See supra Part I.B (discussing the different scrutiny accorded to 
admission rules and so-called alienage rules). 
89 The difficulty with this approach to distinguishing between selection and regu-
lation rules is illustrated by the near-identical attempt of one of the leading immigra-
tion-law casebooks to distinguish “immigration law” from “alienage law.”  The case-
book begins a chapter on alienage law with definitions of the two terms.  It first 
explains that “immigration law . . . as traditionally defined, concerns the admission of 
noncitizens to the United States and the terms under which they may remain.”  ALEINIKOFF 
ET AL., supra note 20, at 1191 (emphasis added). But by including in the formulation 
of immigration law the terms under which noncitizens are permitted to remain, the 
definition sweeps up essentially every type of immigrant-affecting rule.  This is because, 
as explained above, any rule restricting the rights of noncitizens can be formally recast 
as a condition of entry or continuing residence.  As an analytic matter, therefore, this 
definition leaves nothing in the category of alienage law.  This fact is highlighted by 
the casebook’s effort a few sentences later to define alienage law in a way that distin-
guishes it from immigration law:  “Other differences between citizens and permanent 
residents are part of alienage law, which as traditionally defined is distinguished from 
immigration law and addresses other matters relating to the legal status of nonciti-
zens.”  Id. at 1191.  A careful reading reveals that this definition has no analytic con-
tent.  Alienage law is defined simply as that which is not immigration law—as any 
“other differences.”  But since the definition of immigration law given is capacious 
enough to encompass nearly every conceivable legal rule—including the restrictions 
on employment and access to public assistance that are at issue in the cases in this 
chapter, a chapter ostensibly dealing with “alienage law”—the definition of alienage 
law is either incoherent or simply a null set.
90 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1976) (formalizing the re-
quirement that plaintiffs prove discriminatory purpose to make out a claim under the 
Equal Protection Clause); see also Strauss, supra note 87, at 950-51 (describing and criti-
cizing the focus on discriminatory intent in modern Equal Protection Clause jurispru-
dence).  Closely related are the various theories of constitutional law that focus on the 
“expressive significance” or “social meaning” of a particular legal rule.  See Anderson & 
Pildes, supra note 87. 
370 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 341
useful these theories might be for evaluating particular rules relating 
to noncitizens, it is difficult to see how a focus on reasons for action 
can help make the distinction between selection and regulation rules 
more meaningful.  It seems implausible to conclude that it is legiti-
mate for the government to impose a burden on noncitizens for the 
reason of selecting immigrants but illegitimate to impose such a bur-
den for a reason other than selecting immigrants. 
Ultimately, whatever one thinks about these alternative ap-
proaches, doing any of the above—becoming relentlessly empirical, 
focusing on facial features, or turning to a purpose-based inquiry—
would radically change immigration law and theory.  Thus, arguing 
that the dichotomy between so-called selection and regulation rules 
can be saved by adopting one of these alternatives largely proves Part 
II’s central claim—that the existing practices in the field have led to 
deep confusion and incoherence. 
C. Selection and the Role of Membership in Immigration Law and Theory 
Rather than focus on different ways in which we might categorize 
legal rules, perhaps we can rehabilitate immigration law’s focus on the 
uniqueness of immigrant-selecting rules by reconceptualizing what is 
meant by selection.  Linguistically, the difference between selection 
and regulation is generally described as the difference between the 
question of how we choose immigrants and the question of how we 
treat those immigrants whom we have chosen.  This verbal distinction 
often tracks an implicit or explicit distinction between, on one hand, 
the spatial sorting of people across borders, and, on the other hand, 
the treatment of people within a particular border. 
But immigration law is not concerned only with the spatial sorting 
of people across state boundaries.  It is also intimately concerned with 
access to membership in the state’s political community.91  Thus, we 
might try to rehabilitate the distinction between rules that select and 
rules that regulate immigrants by focusing on selection for “member-
ship,” rather than residency.92
A prominent strand of scholarship takes this path, identifying the 
distinction between membership-selecting rules and other rules as 
91 See, e.g., MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING, supra note 41; T. Alexander Al-
einikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 9 (1990). 
92 See Aleinikoff, supra note 91. 
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having foundational legal and moral significance.93  These writers ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly tie the distinction to a moral theory under 
which (1) a state should have considerable leeway to decide whom to 
admit to membership in the political community, and (2) a state 
should be obligated to accord equal treatment to all members of the 
political community.94  The focus on this conceptual distinction stems, 
in large part, from the longstanding influence of a particular strand of 
communitarian political theory on American immigration scholars.  
This work—exemplified by Michael Walzer’s writing in Spheres of Jus-
tice—argues for a sharp distinction between rules that regulate admis-
sion to membership in a political community and rules that affect a 
member’s treatment after admission.95  Walzer argues that few princi-
ples of justice constrain a state’s decision about whom to admit to 
membership; this choice is left largely to the existing political com-
munity.96  In contrast, a state is obligated to accord equal treatment to 
all members of the political community.97
Immigration scholars often suggest that Walzer’s sharp distinction 
between membership-selecting rules and other legal rules provides a 
moral foundation for evaluating a wide variety of immigration policies.  
For example, some immigration scholars suggest that it follows from 
Walzer’s principles that particular deportation policies (sometimes all 
deportation policies other than those that target unlawful entrants) are 
unjust because they represent unequal treatment of those whom we 
have already admitted to membership.  Similarly, some scholars sug-
gest that it is just for the government to decline to admit immigrants 
whom the government deems likely to become public charges, but un-
just for the government to deny admitted immigrants the same access 
to public assistance as citizens have, on the ground that such a restric-
tion falls outside the domain of membership regulation.98
93 See, e.g., BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN, supra note 81, at 74 (distinguish-
ing the legal rules to which noncitizens are subject between those governing “admis-
sion to community membership” and those governing “general status of territorially 
present persons”). 
94 See, e.g., id. at 75. 
95 MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 61-63 (1983). 
96 Id. at 62. 
97 Id. at 41-42, 48. 
98 See, e.g., MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING, supra note 41, at 50-53, 190-91. 
Bosniak makes a similar point:  
The dispute concerns the question whether discriminatory treatment of aliens 
is to be understood as a legitimate exercise of the government’s power to regu-
late membership or as an illegitimate violation of their rights as persons. . . . 
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But shifting our focus from spatial sorting to membership selection 
does not rescue the distinction between selection and regulation rules.  
This is because nothing internal to the theory provides a way to decide 
which legal rules regulate membership.  Thus, without more, Walzer’s 
moral theory does not speak to the legitimacy of the deportation, ad-
mission, or public assistance rules discussed above.  In the examples 
above, what determines whether a particular legal rule regulates access 
to membership?  The case law and scholarship that trades on this dis-
tinction never provide a coherent explanation.99
Immigration theorists who think that Walzer’s moral principles 
help explain this distinction often conflate the idea of entry or admis-
sion into the physical territory of a nation with admission to member-
ship in the political community that is covered by the community-
centered obligations of equality that Walzer emphasizes.  Consider the 
claim above regarding access to welfare benefits.  What distinguishes 
the two legal rules is that the first operates against a noncitizen out-
side the territory of the state while the second operates against a non-
citizen inside the territory.  But Walzer’s communitarian political the-
ory differentiates strongly between rules that select members and rules 
that regulate members.100  We would need to say more to claim that 
the rule regarding the admission of potential public charges operates 
as a rule that selects immigrants for membership in the political 
community, while the rule regarding access to public assistance for 
immigrants operates as a rule that accords differential treatment to 
members of the community.  Specifically, we would have to make an 
additional claim that one should equate admission to the territory 
with immediate admission to membership. 
Walzer does come close to making this claim, though, as I will 
show, he cannot bring himself to commit fully to the conclusions that 
would follow from this position.  He grounds the claim in an idea 
about the relationship between membership and self-governance.  
The idea, which has considerable intuitive appeal at a high level of ab-
straction, is the old democratic ideal that the legitimacy of govern-
ment requires an identity of the governed and the governors.  Under 
                                                                                                                               
[I]n our legal system, noncitizens are subject, broadly speaking, to two distinct 
regimes of regulation and relationship: the first governs admission to commu-
nity membership, and the second governs the general status of territorially pre-
sent persons.  The question in the cases is always which regime controls . . . . 
BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN, supra note 81, at 74. 
99 See, e.g., Bosniak, Membership, supra note 81, at 53-56 (discussing the alienage 
case law that perpetuates this incoherence). 
100 See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 95. 
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this theory, all those subject to the power of the state must have a say 
in decisions about how the state exercises its power.101  At a high level 
of abstraction, Walzer suggests that we can ensure this by (1) imagin-
ing states as territorially bounded entities that exercise power only 
over those within that territory and nowhere else and (2) declaring 
that every person within that territory must be a member of the politi-
cal community that determines how the state exercises power.102  In 
this fashion, all those subject to the coercive force of the state play a 
part in determining how that coercive force is exercised. 
Equating admission to the state’s territory with both admission to 
membership and the application of state power suggests a rather 
quaint world, in which states are completely insular and have perfect 
control over their borders, and in which people for the most part do 
not move or even travel—except in those rare situations where they 
pull up their roots and move permanently to a new nation.  But as this 
description suggests, there are several serious problems with any the-
ory that conceptualizes the world in this way. 
First, the exercise and effect of state power is not, and cannot be, 
contained strictly within the territorial boundaries of the state.  The 
actions of one state pervasively affect the interests of those who live in 
other states.  Perhaps this was less true at some time distant in the 
past, though the history of colonialism would suggest that we would 
have to look back very far to find such a time.  But today the extrater-
ritorial consequences of state action present a potentially fatal prob-
lem for any theory of political legitimacy or morality that requires per-
fect identity of the governed and the governors. 
Second, Walzer’s theory imagines only one type of human move-
ment across borders—permanent relocation.  But not all the comings 
and goings of people across borders fit this model.  Many people 
travel to other countries as tourists, diplomats, and so on.  Some in-
tend to come only temporarily, and even some who intend to remain 
permanently do not want to become citizens.103  What rules of justice 
constrain the treatment of entrants who have no desire to reside per-
manently in the state or become full members?  Walzer’s theory has 
no answers for this question. 
101 See id. at 62 (“[T]he rule of citizens over non-citizens, of members over strang-
ers, is probably the most common form of tyranny in human history.”). 
102 See id. at 64-65, 304-05. 
103 See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN 
IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 20-21 (2002) (discussing cyclical 
and temporary migration from Mexico to the United States). 
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Third, and perhaps most important given the significant influence 
that Spheres of Justice has had on American immigration-law scholar-
ship, Walzer’s world of perfect territorial sovereignty omits any of the 
actual legal institutions responsible for regulating the movement of 
people across borders.  Legal institutions designed to choose new 
members must confront a number of difficulties, including the prob-
lem of imperfect enforcement and the difficulty of identifying desir-
able future members from a large pool of potential migrants.104  The 
first problem, imperfect enforcement, raises the question of what 
treatment should be required of those who enter the territory by evad-
ing the admission system.  Given Walzer’s desire to accord the state 
broad control over membership selection, it is hard to imagine that he 
would believe that those who sneaked across the border could force 
the state to treat them as members.105
But even putting aside the problem of imperfect enforcement, the 
screening problem raises questions for which Walzer’s theory has no 
answers.  While I explained above that Walzer comes close to equating 
admission to the territory with admission to membership, not even he 
would declare every person admitted to the territory an automatic 
member of the political community.  He specifically allows for a pro-
bationary period during which noncitizens who have been admitted to 
the territory can be denied full membership and treated differently 
from how existing members are treated.106  In part, Walzer appears to 
acknowledge that this probationary period is a necessary component 
of any realistic screening process.  The alternative would be to argue 
that all states are morally required to rely only on ex ante screening at 
the point of physical entry to select new members of the political 
community.  And given the tremendous significance of community 
membership for his theory of justice, it is unsurprising that he is un-
willing to commit to this position. 
The problem is that Walzer’s theory provides no explanation of 
what limits should constrain the probationary period.  This does not 
mean that he makes no claims about that period.  Walzer argues, for 
example, that it is acceptable during this probationary period to deny 
104 See Cox & Posner, supra note 4, at 813, 821-22 (discussing the institutional de-
sign issues raised by these problems). 
105 See BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN, supra note 81, at 63-64 (noting that 
Walzer does not consider the possibility of unauthorized entry). 
106 See WALZER, supra note 95, at 61 (“No democratic state can tolerate the estab-
lishment of a fixed status between citizen and foreigner (though there can be stages in 
the transition from one of these political identities to the other).”). 
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the new entrants political participation rights, but not acceptable to 
deny them any social or economic rights accorded to citizens.107  Be-
cause his theory of obligation does not explain these requirements or 
the distinction between social and political rights, his defense of this 
view is vague and unsatisfying.  Walzer’s restrictions on the probation-
ary period—making it extremely brief and easy to pass—seem de-
signed to assuage his unease with the idea of deviating from the strict 
view that admission to the territory equals admission to membership.  
Legal scholars do much the same thing.  They also often recognize 
that it is acceptable to have some probationary period.  And, like Wal-
zer, they argue that the probationary period should be brief and not 
particularly demanding.108
Both Walzer and legal scholars may be right about the probation-
ary period.  But one needs a theory about how principles of justice 
constrain the structure of the probationary period and the treatment 
of immigrants during that period.  The distinction between member-
selecting rules and other rules cannot provide such a theory, because 
such a theory itself would be what defines the distinction.  (This is 
what makes the membership theory basically question-begging.) 
 The upshot is this:  the membership view of the distinction be-
tween selection rules and regulation rules is, like the spatial-sorting 
view, somewhat seductive when stated at a very high level of abstrac-
tion.  The problem is that redefining “selection” does not help us de-
termine which legal rules should count as membership-selecting rules.  
Neither courts nor immigration scholars have provided such a theory.  
Walzer’s work purports to provide such a theory by equating physical 
admission with membership acquisition.  But whatever the intuitive 
appeal of this idea, the theory’s excessively thin conception of the va-
rieties of human movement in the world, combined with its lack of 
any conception of the actual legal institutions necessary to regulate 
human movement in its various forms, renders it theoretically inade-
quate to help answer the questions of central importance to American 
immigration law today. 
Again, this does not mean that there are no reasons why the gov-
ernment might be obligated to treat, for example, long-term residents 
107 See id. at 60 (“[T]hey must be possessed of those basic civil liberties whose exer-
cise is so much preparation for voting and office holding.”). 
108 See, e.g., MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING, supra note 41, at 120-21, 155-57 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s recognition of a probationary period in Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), and explaining that a waiting period is consistent 
with immigration as transition). 
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differently from short-term residents, or differently from those who 
have never entered the United States.  My only point is that any obli-
gation the government has to do so does not depend on whether a 
particular legal rule is classified as a membership-selecting rule or as 
some other type of rule.  The focus on membership is therefore at 
best unhelpful and at worst misleading. 
III. SECOND-ORDER STRATEGIES IN IMMIGRATION LAW
To say that efforts to divide legal rules into two boxes based on 
whether they select or regulate immigrants will inevitably fail is not to 
say that there is no meaningful distinction between the concepts of se-
lection and regulation themselves.  As I emphasized at the outset, spa-
tial sorting and behavioral regulation are two very different things.  In 
fact, my critique of immigration law above depends crucially on the 
idea that these are two analytically distinct types of human behavior.  
The central difficulty is that every territorially bounded rule creates 
both sorting and regulatory pressure. 
As Part II.B explained, this might suggest that we can rehabilitate 
immigration law’s organizing framework.  Perhaps courts and com-
mentators have been wrong to think that immigrant-affecting rules 
can concern either selection or regulation, with the resulting analytic 
confusion leading to pervasive disagreement and unproductive de-
bate.  But once we get past this confusion we could still try to separate 
legal rules on the basis of something like their predominant empirical 
consequences. 
This Part argues that such an effort would be misguided.  The rea-
son is that selection and regulation are simply alternative strategies for 
achieving whatever one’s normative goals or constitutional commit-
ments happen to be.  Thus, even if we could overcome a century of 
radical disagreement about which rules produce greater selection ef-
fects and which produce greater regulatory effects—perhaps by devel-
oping a much richer empirical account of each rule’s actual conse-
quences—it would be a mistake to hold an a priori preference for 
either selection mechanisms or regulatory mechanisms.  Neither 
mechanism has an inherently positive or negative valence. 
To see this point, consider the example of immigration and public 
assistance.  If Congress is worried about the fiscal effects of immigra-
tion, it might allay that concern in at least two ways.  First, it could de-
cide not to admit immigrants who might later fall into poverty.  Sec-
ond, it could make admitted immigrants ineligible for public 
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assistance.  Each of these rules will create both selection pressure and 
regulatory pressure, affecting whether immigrants choose to live in 
the United States and how they live their lives in the United States.  
But even if we assumed that the first rule produced exclusively selec-
tion effects and the second produced exclusively regulatory effects, 
that would not lead to the conclusion that the first rule—the selection 
mechanism—is superior.  To the contrary, the question of which 
strategy is more efficacious or morally attractive in this particular con-
text would remain. 
Immigration law and scholarship should focus more directly on 
this question of mechanism design, rather than simply assuming the 
superiority of one mechanism over the other.  An analogy to recent 
property-theory literature may be helpful here.  Over the last several 
years, Henry Smith has written an important set of papers about 
mechanism design in property law.  His central insight is that the de-
sign of property law often entails a choice between the strategy of ex-
clusion and the strategy of governance.109  These twin strategies-–
which are similar to the mechanisms of selection and regulation in 
immigration law–-represent alternative ways in which a property 
owner may control the use of a particular resource.  Smith develops 
an information theory about when exclusion is preferable to govern-
ance and vice versa.110  While Smith’s theory of mechanism choice 
does not translate directly to immigration law, the general idea of de-
veloping a theory about the comparative desirability of alternative 
regulatory mechanisms is directly applicable. 
As Smith has done for property theory, it is possible to develop 
theories about the situations in which it is desirable for the govern-
ment to emphasize one strategy or the other (while remaining atten-
tive to the fact that all legal rules will produce both selection and 
regulation effects).  These efforts should allow us to develop new ways 
of categorizing immigration rules that are analytically sharper and 
normatively more significant.111  But whatever these new analytic 
frameworks turn out to be, they will not track the misleading distinc-
tion between selection rules and regulation rules. 
109 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance:  Two Strategies for Delineating 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S464-71, S486-87 (2002) (recognizing a spec-
trum of property rights with exclusion and governance as endpoints). 
110 See id.
111 Consider, for example, the distinction between ex ante and ex post screening 
rules that Eric Posner and I have developed elsewhere.  See Cox & Posner, supra note 4, 
at 824-27.  
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To demonstrate this in more detail, this Part considers three cen-
tral normative commitments underpinning immigration law.  Asking 
how best to advance these commitments demonstrates that selection 
and regulation are simply alternative strategies without an inherent 
normative or constitutional valence.  For as I will show, these com-
mitments turn out to be generally unconnected to the distinction be-
tween selection and regulation. 
Before proceeding with the examples, I should note one caveat:  
the normative commitments discussed below are what we might think 
of as midlevel theories.  My aim here is not to explore what particular 
high-level moral theories—such as a welfarist approach (in its global 
or national flavors), a Rawlsian approach, or some other theory of jus-
tice—might have to say about the desirability of various immigration 
rules.112  Instead, this Article’s more modest goal is to show that while 
the midlevel theories prominent in immigration law and scholarship 
do have significant implications for the legitimacy or desirability of 
particular immigration rules, those implications do not track the dis-
tinction between the mechanisms of selection and regulation. 
A.  Immigrant Integration 
The importance of integrating immigrants into a receiving state is 
a central value that motivates much immigration law and scholar-
112 One reason for not taking that approach here is that much of the existing work 
that considers the relevance of these high-level theories for immigration policy con-
cerns a very abstract question:  whether any significant restrictions on the free move-
ment of people across borders are defensible.  See, e.g., Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and 
Citizens:  The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. POL. 251 (1987) (drawing on several con-
temporary approaches to political theory to argue for open borders); Timothy King, 
Immigration from Developing Countries: Some Philosophical Issues, 93 ETHICS 525, 536-31 
(1983) (summarizing various philosophical arguments for and against relatively open 
borders); Michael Blake & Matthias Risse, Is There a Human Right to Free Movement?  Im-
migration and Original Ownership of the Earth 3-5 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t Faculty 
Research Working Paper Series, Paper No. RWP06-012, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=902383 (examining the relationship of persons to land as a 
source of moral constraints on immigration controls).  This debate is important, but it 
is somewhat disconnected from the actual institutional details that legal scholars of 
immigration should be interested in evaluating.  The most important questions con-
fronting American immigration law today do not include the question whether we 
should have open borders.  Instead, the questions concern issues like the desirability of 
particular temporary worker programs, the appropriateness of America’s emphasis on 
family migration rather than migration on some other basis, and the usefulness of our 
large-scale criminal deportation system. 
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ship.113  Exactly what is meant by integration and why it might be valu-
able are complex questions that are not important to rehash here.114
Understood in a limited (and oversimplified) fashion, integration can 
be thought of as the process by which an immigrant adjusts to life in a 
new society—which might include acquiring some language skills, se-
curing relatively stable work, developing social networks, and so on.115
Defined in this way, integration can be valuable for both the receiving 
state and the immigrant herself. 
The integration-related consequences of a legal rule bearing on 
immigrants are certainly of considerable normative significance.  
Moreover, there are a variety of ways in which legal rules might affect 
the process of immigrant integration.  Some rules will affect mecha-
nisms of integration that operate at the level of individual immigrants.  
These rules might change (1) the immigrant’s desires, (2) the immi-
grant’s integration-related opportunities, or (3) the immigrant’s in-
formation about her opportunities.116  Other rules will affect mecha-
nisms of integration that operate at the level of groups.  Integration is 
in many ways a collective process, and immigration rules can affect the 
group-related mechanisms of integration by influencing things like 
113 See, e.g., MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING, supra note 41, at 189 (“The es-
sence of immigration as transition is giving lawful immigrants the best chance to be-
long in America, in a broad sense that goes beyond formal citizenship to include inte-
gration into American society.”); Hiroshi Motomura, Choosing Immigrants, Making 
Citizens, 59 STAN. L. REV. 857, 869-70 (2007) [hereinafter Motomura, Choosing] (em-
phasizing that a primary concern of legal immigrants is the transition to permanent 
residence and citizenship); Cristina M. Rodriguez, Guest Workers and Integration:  Toward 
a Theory of What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219, 
222-23 (arguing that guest worker programs should be avoided because they inhibit 
integration). 
114 For background on this issue, see, for example, RICHARD ALBA & VICTOR NEE,
REMAKING THE AMERICAN MAINSTREAM: ASSIMILATION AND CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRA-
TION (2003).   
115 See id. at 215-70 (reviewing the historical record of “key areas” of contempo-
rary assimilation, including language, socioeconomic status, residential change, and 
intermarriage).  In practice, of course, integration also involves the receiving state’s 
changing in response to the presence of new residents.  See Susan K. Brown & Frank 
D. Bean, Assimilation Models, Old and New:  Explaining a Long-Term Process, MIGRATION 
INFORMATION SOURCE (Migration Pol’y Inst., Wash., D.C.), Oct. 2006, http:// www. 
migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=442 (discussing the reciprocal 
nature of the process of integration).  
116 See JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 13-21 (1989) 
(“[A]ctions are explained by opportunities and desires—by what people can do and by 
what they want to do.”). 
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immigrants’ housing patterns or their concentration in certain em-
ployment sectors.117
While immigrant-affecting rules will often have important conse-
quences for integration, their effect on integration does not turn on 
whether they operate principally through the mechanism of selection 
or regulation.  The conventional wisdom suggests that we should be 
skeptical of rules that regulate immigrants outside the selection con-
text because such rules are likely to interfere with integration.118  It is 
on this ground that commentators often criticize rules that limit im-
migrants’ employment opportunities or access to government bene-
fits.119  These commentators might well be right that the particular 
policies that they criticize interfere with integration.  But if so, it is not 
simply because those rules operate as regulatory mechanisms to shape 
integration-related opportunities or desires.  The mechanism of selec-
tion can have similarly powerful effects on integration. 
To see this, consider the archetypical immigrant-selection rules:  
the admissions criteria that determine which potential immigrants 
(and how many) will be permitted to enter a state.  Even were we to 
assume that those rules affected only spatial sorting, it is clear that 
admissions criteria have significant consequences for immigrant inte-
gration.  For example, if language skills are crucial to successful immi-
grant integration (a point about which there is some disagreement), 
then admissions criteria that reward potential migrants who speak the 
primary language of the receiving state can improve the process of in-
tegration.120  Similarly, if family networks facilitate integration, then 
admission rules can promote integration by privileging the admission 
of migrants with family already living in the receiving state.121
Thus, to the extent that one believes that we should evaluate im-
migration rules on the basis of their consequences for immigrant in-
tegration, focusing on the distinction between selection and regula-
117 Cf. MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN AMERICA 96-126 (2004) (discussing these sorts of mechanisms in the context 
of Filipino migration during the early part of the twentieth century). 
118 See, e.g., MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING, supra note 41, at 151-67. 
119 See generally Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-23 (1982) (concluding that restrict-
ing noncitizen children’s access to public education would interfere with their integra-
tion into the United States). 
120 See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? 158-70 (2004) (arguing that 
linguistic enclaves threaten the process of integration). 
121 See THE NEW IMMIGRATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 105-215 (Marcelo 
M. Suárez-Orozco et al. eds., 2005) (discussing the role that family structures can play 
in integration); see also Cox & Posner, supra note 4, at 854-55 (same). 
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tion does little to improve our understanding of how best to promote 
that goal.  Hiroshi Motomura’s book Americans in Waiting, which does 
a wonderful job of explaining why we should be centrally concerned 
with the process of incorporating noncitizens, chooses to say almost 
nothing about the structure of the United States’ admissions system.122
But my conclusions suggest that the admissions system—and the pos-
sibility that the government can use that system as a substitute for the 
postadmission rules on which Motomura focuses—should be central 
to any inquiry focusing on immigrant integration. 
Moreover, it is important to emphasize that this conclusion does 
not depend upon any controversial assumption about the moral status 
of those who live outside the state.  Sometimes it seems as though 
commentators decouple their discussion of admission rules from rules 
that they classify as immigrant regulating because they think that ad-
mission rules can be evaluated only by making difficult judgments 
about the obligations owed to outsiders:  Are we cosmopolitans?  
Communitarians?  Something else?  But this conclusion is a mistake 
produced by an excessively individualistic and ex ante focus—a focus 
on the consequences of the admission rule for the potential immi-
grant herself, and a focus on the potential immigrant only prior to the 
application of the admission criteria.  Focusing directly on principles 
like the promotion of integration shows how this way of thinking can 
be misleading.  When a state selects an immigration policy to promote 
integration, it need not be embracing a cosmopolitan commitment to 
the life of a prospective immigrant who will benefit from the policy.  
Instead, the state could be advancing a purely self-interested commit-
ment:  the state might believe, for example, that integration is critical 
to the maintenance of its own democratic institutions.123
B. Second-Class Status 
Concerns about second-class status are pervasive in immigration 
scholarship and crop up from time to time in immigration jurispru-
dence.  For example, such concern motivates the central thesis of 
Daniel Kanstroom’s book Deportation Nation.124  His principal critique 
is that deportation is used as a tool of “social control,” with some de-
122 See supra text accompanying notes 41-44. 
123 This is a common theme in the literature on assimilation and integration.  See, 
e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 88-95 (1980); HUNT-
INGTON, supra note 120, at 178-220. 
124 See supra text accompanying notes 26-32. 
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portation rules subjecting resident noncitizens to more rigorous stan-
dards of acceptable conduct than apply to the rest of the population.  
By subjecting a particular group to special forms of social control, he 
suggests, these deportation rules relegate resident noncitizens to a 
subordinated, second-class status.125
The United States has a long history of legal regimes that have 
been criticized for creating second-class groups—Jim Crow laws that 
persisted for nearly a century being but one example.  To be sure, 
some claims about second-class status in law are tied specifically to the 
idea of second-class treatment for those who are citizens.  But the idea 
need not focus only on the treatment of those who possess formal le-
gal citizenship.  Concern about legal rules that promote second-class 
status can be understood in a more catholic sense.  Kanstroom, for 
example, relies on a more capacious understanding that is amenable 
to claims of second-class status even by those who lack formal  
citizenship status. 
Kanstroom’s concern about the promotion of second-class status is 
a very real one.  But like the commitment to integration, concerns 
about second-class status do not track the distinction between the 
mechanisms of selection and regulation.  As Part I explained, 
Kanstroom draws a relatively sharp distinction between deportation 
on the basis of post-entry conduct—in particular, the criminal depor-
tation rules—-and deportation to enforce the prohibition on unlawful 
entry.126  On his account, the latter rules may be an inevitable part of 
the immigrant-selection process, while the former rules represent ille-
gitimate forms of social control that relegate immigrants to second-
class status.  Kanstroom is right that the criminal deportation rules 
operate in part as a regulatory mechanism, leading immigrants to live 
in ways different from citizens.  But he is wrong to suggest that this 
fact is what makes criminal deportation rules threatening to those 
concerned about second-class status.127
125 See KANSTROOM, supra note 26, at 10-12. 
126 See supra text accompanying notes 26-30. 
127 Remember that Deportation Nation is also wrong to suggest that only deportation 
rules that are triggered by post-entry behavior operate in part as regulatory mecha-
nisms.  As I explained in Part II, even putative selection rules, such as the rule that 
makes deportable a person who is in the country unlawfully, operate in part as regula-
tory mechanisms.  This rule creates pressure for those in the country unlawfully to live 
in ways minimizing their contact with government officials.  See supra text accompany-
ing notes 72-73.  As a result, undocumented immigrants often have less access to many 
of the institutions of civil society (such as law enforcement) than the rest of the popu-
2008] Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles 383
Selection mechanisms can similarly affect the creation of second-
class groups.  Admissions criteria, which are often thought of as the 
paradigmatic selection rules (and which clearly produce selection ef-
fects), can promote or diffuse the possibility of creating second-class 
groups within a society.  Second-class status in the United States has 
sometimes been associated with dramatic income inequality.  As 
George Borjas and others have noted, admission rules can affect the 
level of income inequality in a state.  Admission rules like those in the 
United States, which focus on family-based immigration, tend to alter 
the composition of the immigrant pool in ways that increase the levels 
of poverty and income inequality in society.128  Systems that focus on 
highly skilled employment immigration tend to have the opposite ef-
fect of reducing income inequality.  In short, both sorting and regula-
tory mechanisms have important consequences for group subordina-
tion or the creation of second-class status.  The distinction between so-
called selection rules and regulation rules obscures this point.  Get-
ting past the distinction promotes more comprehensive and coherent 
evaluation of the implications of immigration law for concerns about 
second-class status.129
Importantly, this argument does not depend on admission rules 
producing regulatory effects, though they certainly do.  Rather, my 
point is that both the mechanism of selection and the mechanism of 
regulation can have powerful effects on the creation of second-class 
groups.  For that reason, valuing that normative commitment itself 
provides no reason to prefer one mechanism over the other. 
                                                                                                                               
lation—something of potentially serious concern for those concerned about second-
class status. 
128 See, e.g., GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN’S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE 
AMERICAN ECONOMY 62-64 (1999) (arguing that an immigration policy that encourages 
less-skilled workers to enter the United States will harm the economic well-being of 
native low-wage workers). 
129 The argument would apply largely unchanged if one were concerned more 
about preserving certain kinds of opportunities than about preventing the creation of 
second-class groups.  Concern for opportunity-limiting rules might lead us to be skep-
tical of rules that restrict immigrant access to things like employment or voting.  But as 
I explained in Part II, even archetypical selection rules like admission requirements 
can restrict those opportunities.  So if our normative concern is discouraging legal 
rules that interfere with an individual’s opportunity to pick a particular profession or  
spouse, for example, there will be little reason to distinguish between so-called selec-
tion rules and other rules. 
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C. Impermissible Choices 
We might think that there are certain choices that states simply 
should not offer to potential immigrants.  The idea that some choices 
and bargains are impermissible is commonplace in law.  The law voids 
certain contractual arrangements as unconscionable, proscribes the 
sale of babies and body parts, and prohibits individuals from bargain-
ing away certain constitutional protections.130  The reasons for these 
limitations on the choices that people make and the bargains into 
which they enter are varied and occasionally a bit mysterious.  Some-
times the restrictions seem to stem from concern about deficiencies in 
the individual’s process of choosing that are the result of informa-
tional asymmetries, bargaining-power disparities, externalities, and so 
forth.  Often, however, the law forbids certain bargains regardless of 
whether any decision-making defects are present.131  We have ex-
tremely strong intuitions that a person may not sell herself into slavery 
in any situation, even if we are hard pressed to pinpoint the source of 
that intuition. 
The idea of impermissible choices (or unconstitutional condi-
tions) is nascent in immigration law and scholarship.  At times consti-
tutional immigration jurisprudence has suggested that immigrants are 
not permitted to trade away certain constitutional protections in ex-
change for the right to reside in the United States.132  Commentators 
sometimes go further, proposing that a receiving state should not 
force potential immigrants to choose between residing in the state 
and, say, occupational freedom.133  Given the pervasiveness of the idea 
of impermissible bargains throughout law, the fact that these ideas 
appear in immigration jurisprudence and scholarship is unsurprising. 
130 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE (1993) (exploring the 
desirability of limiting the power of the state to bargain with its citizens); Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989) (“The doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions holds that government may not grant a benefit on 
the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the govern-
ment may withhold that benefit altogether.”). 
131 See Saul Levmore, Lecture, Unconditional Relationships, 76 B.U. L. REV. 807, 808-
13 (1996). 
132 See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 33 (1982) (“[A] continuously present 
permanent resident alien has a right to due process [when threatened with deporta-
tion].”); The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (requiring that an 
immigrant be given “all opportunity to be heard upon the questions involving his right 
to be and remain in the United States” before deportation). 
133 See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 95, at 56-61 (objecting to all guest worker programs 
on these grounds). 
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While this concern for impermissible bargains has an important 
place in immigration law and theory, the commitment does not track 
the distinction between the mechanisms of selection and regulation.  
Both putative immigrant-selecting and immigrant-regulating rules can 
violate a constraint on permissible bargains.  Consider, for example, a 
rule that grants an immigrant the right to reside in the United States 
on a three-year employment visa.134  Or consider a rule that makes 
resident noncitizens ineligible for Medicaid for five years after admis-
sion.135  The first rule might be more likely thought of as an immi-
grant-selecting rule, while the second might be more likely described 
as an immigrant-regulating rule.  But each of these rules might raise 
questions about permissible choices.  One might believe, for example, 
that it is impermissible for a state to offer potential immigrants a 
choice under conditions in which the immigrants are likely to have lit-
tle information about the consequences of that choice, or where im-
migrants’ estimates of those consequences are for cognitive reasons 
terribly biased.  On this theory, the permissibility of an immigrant-
affecting rule would depend directly on the presence of information 
deficiencies or cognitive biases.  If potential immigrants tend to be ex-
cessively optimistic about their future health but realistic about the 
likelihood that they will want to remain in the United States after 
working here for three years, we might be more comfortable with 
temporary employment visas than with restrictions on Medicaid ac-
cess.  On different assumptions, however, the healthcare rule could 
look much better and the temporary admission rule much worse. 
Relatedly, consider an approach that focuses on bargaining 
power.  On this conception of impermissible choices, the legitimacy of 
a rule like the Medicaid restriction would turn in part on the other 
options available to potential migrants.  It might be much more per-
missible to impose the rule on well-educated, highly skilled migrants 
with many destination country options than on, say, potential political 
asylees.
These are, of course, stylized examples.  Explaining exactly why 
the Constitution or some moral theory prescribes particular choices 
(or conditions on choice) is extremely difficult, as attested to by the 
vast and largely unsatisfying literature on unconstitutional conditions.  
134 See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4) (2006) (limiting the period of authorized admission 
for temporary-worker visas to six years); 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(h)(9)(iii), (h)(15)(ii)(B) 
(2008) (outlining the various time-period restrictions on approvals for temporary 
workers, depending on their occupations). 
135 See  8 U.S.C. § 1613. 
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Nonetheless, the important point is that this difficult but quite rele-
vant question is obscured by the pervasive focus on the distinction be-
tween immigrant selection and regulation. 
*      *      * 
Each of the normative theories I have sampled here may or may 
not be particularly compelling.  But my point is not to defend them 
on their merits.  My aim instead is to show that concern for those 
commitments should not lead us systematically to prefer the mecha-
nism of selection over regulation, or vice versa.  One could obviously 
choose different examples and alternative normative theories to make 
this point.  For example, there is a legal consensus that tourists should 
not vote but that a tourist charged with a crime should receive the 
same procedural protections available to citizens.136  There are a vari-
ety of theories that might reconcile these twin intuitions.  One possi-
bility turns on something about the nature of the right itself; voting is 
sometimes considered less fundamental or universal than other types 
of rights.137  Another possibility is tied to a particular conception of 
democracy:  that voting rights need only be available to those whose 
interests are affected in a sufficiently substantial or permanent way by 
government action, which might not be the case for tourists.  A third 
possibility is tied to exit opportunities:  there may be instances in 
which exit may serve as a legitimate substitute for access to political 
voice, and tourists may have more obvious exit opportunities than 
many others.  Regardless of the precise theory, however, the point is 
that most puzzles about the legitimacy or desirability of particular 
immigration rules are best understood by reference to the same prob-
136 With a few potential exceptions, states and local governments have never permit-
ted noncitizens who were temporary residents to vote.  See generally RON HAYDUK, DE-
MOCRACY FOR ALL: RESTORING IMMIGRANT VOTING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 87-107 
(2006) (analyzing examples of immigrants voting in local elections); KEYSSAR, supra note 
36 (surveying the history of the franchise in the United States, including restrictions on 
voting by noncitizens).  In contrast, for over a century clear Supreme Court precedent 
has accorded noncitizens charged with crimes the same due process protections available 
to citizens.  See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896). 
137 See, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 1-64 (3d ed. 2007) 
(surveying cases that highlight the complicated constitutional status of voting rights in 
the United States).  Of course, some process-perfecting theories of constitutional law flip 
this presumption and treat full access to the political process as perhaps the most impor-
tant right.  See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 116-25 (1980) 
(“[U]nblocking stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial review preeminently 
ought to be about, and denial of the vote seems the quintessential stoppage.”). 
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lems and theories prominent in other areas of law.  Treating the prob-
lems as unique to the immigration arena is generally unproductive 
and frequently counterproductive. 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Lifting the haze created by the misleading distinction between se-
lection rules and regulatory rules has important implications for the 
institutional design of immigration systems.  Part III highlighted per-
haps the most important one:  there is no a priori reason to prefer the 
mechanism of selection over regulation—or vice versa—when evaluat-
ing the structure of immigration law.  But other concrete insights also 
follow from understanding more fully the consequences of legal rules 
for spatial sorting and other sorts of behavioral regulation.  This Part 
briefly highlights three such implications, each of which allows us to 
begin thinking more creatively about the structure of immigration law. 
A.  Immigration Law and Information Policy 
My focus on the material consequences of immigrant-affecting 
rules highlights the importance that information can play in immigra-
tion policy.  Consider the decisions immigrants make about whether 
to enter the United States.  Sometimes these decisions are directly 
constrained by the coercive force of the state.  An immigrant might 
present herself for admission at the border and be turned away be-
cause she falls within one of the grounds of inadmissibility under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.138  More often, however, immigrants’ 
spatial-sorting decisions will be constrained by the way in which legal 
rules shape their incentives.  An immigrant might choose to enter in 
part because she knows that her children will be able to go to public 
school, or she might choose not to enter because she knows that she 
will face restrictions on job mobility.139  This is, of course, no more 
than a standard account of how law works.  Law pervasively regulates 
behavior by generating incentives, not solely through the direct exer-
tion of coercive force. 
138 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006) (setting out the grounds of inadmissibility, includ-
ing, for example, insanity, drug addiction, and criminality). 
139 See, e.g., Shachar, supra note 80, at 164-65 (proposing that skilled migrants seek 
not only improved employment but also a home country that will provide valuable 
benefits). 
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Of course, a legal rule can affect immigrants’ decisions about 
where to live only if those immigrants have information about the ex-
istence and content of the rule.  As a matter of institutional design, 
this means that some immigrant-affecting rules might be less effective 
by virtue of the fact that they are less well known.  For example, state 
rules relating to immigrants may be less effective sorting mechanisms 
if immigrants are likely to have less information about state rules than 
federal rules.  To know whether this is true, we would need to know 
considerably more about the way in which information is transmitted 
to communities of potential immigrants.140  But it seems possible that 
these communities are less likely to have information about state and 
local policies, either because of the greater number and diversity of 
such policies, or because of the lack of formal institutions like consu-
lar offices to transmit information.  If so, state policies may not be par-
ticularly effective substitutes for federal policies because they may 
send weaker signals to noncitizens contemplating migration. 
More generally, recognizing the role of information suggests that 
information policy may be an important component of a state’s immi-
gration policy.  To the extent that a state wants immigrants to assess 
accurately the costs and benefits of migration decisions, it has an in-
terest in facilitating information transmission.  Moreover, receiving 
states might use information policy directly as a strategy for signaling 
potential migrants.  Lior Strahilevitz has advanced a similar argument 
with respect to property law.141  He has argued that exclusion in prop-
erty regimes is often accomplished not through coercion but though 
the use of what he terms “exclusionary vibes,” which “involve[] the 
landowner’s communication to potential entrants about the character 
of the community’s inhabitants.  Such communication tells potential 
entrants that certain people may not feel welcome if they enter the 
community in question . . . .”142  What role this sort of signaling can or 
should play in immigration policy has gone largely unexplored.  Its 
140 There is a substantial literature by sociologists studying these information net-
works and their role in facilitating migration.  See, e.g., STEPHEN CASTLES & MARK J.
MILLER, THE AGE OF MIGRATION 21-32 (3d ed. 2003) (surveying literature on the dif-
ferent theories of migration, including informal information networks).  But for the 
most part this work does not focus specifically on the transmission of information 
about legal conditions in the receiving state.   
141 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 1835 (2006). 
142 Id. at 1851. 
2008] Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles 389
significance has been obscured by conventional accounts of the struc-
ture of immigration law. 
B. Immigration Federalism Redux 
Immigration federalism is another arena in which my central ana-
lytic claims have interesting implications for institutional design.  As 
Part I explained, courts often hold that the constitutional authority of 
a state or local government to enact a rule that affects immigrants de-
pends on whether or not the rule is considered a selection rule.143
States are often thought to be barred from enacting immigrant-
selecting rules.  But given that every immigrant-affecting rule that a 
state enacts can alter both where and how noncitizens live, the consti-
tutional claim that immigrant selection should, or even can, be the 
exclusive province of the federal government is misguided. 
Although it is analytically impossible to prohibit states from enact-
ing rules that affect the spatial sorting of noncitizens, this does not 
mean that there are no differences between state and federal regula-
tion of noncitizens.  Indeed, my focus on the consequences of immi-
grant-affecting rules points to an important analytic distinction be-
tween state and federal rules:  their different jurisdictional boundaries 
create different types of spatial sorting pressure.  In other words, state 
laws disaggregate the spatial sorting pressure imposed by a federal 
rule.  A state rule typically imposes costs (or benefits) only on the de-
cision to live within the boundaries of the state.  In contrast, a federal 
rule imposes costs (or benefits) on the decision to live anywhere 
within the nation’s borders. 
Debates about the legality and legitimacy of state efforts to regu-
late noncitizens generally overlook this way in which the sorting pres-
sure imposed by state and federal rules differs.  It is possible that 
courts and commentators ignore this analytic difference because they 
believe that it is of little practical significance, and in some instances 
this may be true.  Some migrants may have only one plausible destina-
tion in the United States, perhaps because of their family and social 
connections, or perhaps because of the structure of the U.S. labor 
market.  For this group of migrants, a state rule that creates pressure 
to leave the state will, in practice, create pressure to leave the coun-
143 See supra text accompanying notes 48-64. 
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try.144  In such situations, state policies will be close substitutes for simi-
lar federal policies. 
But many immigrants today are not so constrained.  The rise of 
new migration destinations in North Carolina, Iowa, and other states is 
suggestive evidence of this increased mobility.145  And as settlement op-
tions for migrants expand, the sorting consequences of state and local 
rules will diverge from the consequences of immigrant-affecting fed-
eral rules.  State rules will more and more frequently create pressure 
for interstate sorting but not for sorting across national boundaries. 
Whether such interstate sorting of immigrants should be cause for 
celebration or concern is well beyond the scope of this Article.  But 
this difficult question is not unique to immigration policy; rather, it is 
a central question of the large literatures on federal systems, jurisdic-
tional competition, and democratic theory.  This work reveals that 
there are both virtues and vices to such interstate sorting—which 
might explain why American constitutional traditions reflect consid-
erable tension about its desirability.146  Those traditions are sometimes 
read to endorse such sorting as a way to alleviate conflict among di-
verse groups living within a shared republic.147  At the same time, 
American constitutional law has long frowned on rules that impair the 
right of internal mobility.148  Whatever the status of this debate, immi-
144 Cf. Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Is Seeing Signs of Flight by Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 2008, at A13 (reporting that some immigrants in Arizona are returning to 
their home countries in part because of restrictive state laws that penalize employers 
for hiring immigrants who lack work authorization); Illegal Immigrants Leaving Arizona,
Associated Press, USA TODAY, Dec. 22, 2007, http://usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-
12-22-immigration-leaving_N.htm (same). 
145 See AUDREY SINGER, THE BROOKINGS INST., THE RISE OF NEW IMMIGRANT 
GATEWAYS, available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2004/ 
02demographics_singer/20040301_gateways.pdf (analyzing past, present, and pro-
jected future gateways for immigrants to the United States); Rodríguez, supra note 48, 
at 588-89 (describing the rise of Iowa as a new settlement area for immigrants). 
146 For example, Michael Walzer takes the position that political morality requires 
every nation state to guarantee freedom of internal movement.  See, e.g., WALZER, supra
note 95, at 36-42.  He famously invoked this principle to bolster his defense of national 
restrictions on immigration.  See id. at 39 (arguing that the absence of national border 
controls would lead to the creation of a “thousand petty fortresses” as local govern-
ments worked to exclude those they deemed undesirable).      
147 See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism and Fear:  Sorting and Democratizing 
Politics in Federal Regimes ( Jan. 8, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/law-and-politics-workshop-hills.pdf (analyzing the 
history of sorting policies in Western societies and their various degrees of success at 
limiting internal conflict). 
148 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504-07 (1999) (holding that a state’s one-
year residency requirement to receive benefits under the federal Temporary Assistance 
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gration scholarship would do far better to focus on this question than 
on ineffectual efforts to classify state and local rules as either concern-
ing or not concerning immigrant selection. 
C. Temporary Deportation 
America’s deportation policy is one of the most widely criticized 
aspects of modern immigration law.  Over the past several decades, 
the scope of conduct that renders an immigrant deportable has ex-
panded at a breathtaking rate.  Today a wide variety of minor criminal 
conduct renders even long-term permanent residents deportable.  
This trend is part of what has led Kanstroom and others to argue that 
deportation has morphed into a form of “social control.”149
The current deportation rules may well deserve widespread con-
demnation.150  But if they do, it is not for the reason Kanstroom ar-
gues.  His critique misses the mark because all deportation rules cre-
ate both sorting pressure and pressure to live in a particular way.151
But the effort to conceptualize deportation as concerned purely 
with selection (and to criticize deportation rules that deviate from the 
selection model) causes an additional problem:  it obscures legal-
design options by flattening the concept of deportation.  Viewing de-
portation as exclusively about selection—either for residence or for 
membership—leads us to think about deportation as a binary concept.  
On this understanding, deportation becomes an on-off switch that 
controls whether a particular noncitizen will be deselected. 
Once we abandon this exclusive focus on selection, it becomes 
clear that deportation need not be seen as a binary concept.  In the 
same way that there are varieties of admission—with some immigrants 
admitted as permanent residents, others as temporary workers, and so 
on—there can be varieties of deportation.  The concept of deporta-
tion can be disaggregated into (1) the physical removal of a nonciti-
zen from the territorial United States, accompanied by (2) an addi-
tional set of legal conditions relating to the noncitizen’s right to 
reside in the United States.  Describing the concept of deportation in 
this fashion draws attention to the fact that some such variation al-
                                                                                                                               
to Needy Families program unconstitutionally infringed upon the right to travel); cf.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges 
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). 
149 See supra text accompanying notes 26-30. 
150 See, e.g., Cox & Posner, supra note 4, at 835-44 (suggesting some reasons why the 
current deportation rules may make little sense). 
151 See supra text accompanying notes 72-76. 
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ready exists in U.S. immigration law.  The Immigration Code typically 
makes a deportee ineligible to apply for readmission for a fixed pe-
riod of time—sometimes five or ten years, though a lifetime bar on 
readmission is becoming increasingly common.152  Even in existing 
law, therefore, deportation is not quite binary. 
But disaggregating the concept of deportation highlights a much 
broader suite of available legal rules.  One possibility is the idea of 
temporary deportation, which has never been considered by immigra-
tion scholars.  A temporary deportation rule would be one that re-
quired the physical removal of a person from the country but ac-
corded this person the right to reenter after a fixed period of time.153
Relatedly, conditions other than temporal restrictions could be placed 
on the noncitizen’s right of reentry.  Deportation provisions could, for 
example, make those currently subject to deportation for minor drug 
crimes eligible for readmission upon the completion of qualified drug 
treatment outside the country. 
Like the other options discussed in this Part, disaggregating de-
portation, and thereby expanding the suite of regulatory options 
available to a state, could have both advantages and disadvantages.  It 
could lead to excessive reliance by the government on temporary de-
portation as a substitute for other regulatory measures, such as crimi-
nal prosecution.  On the other hand, it could alleviate some costly and 
potentially counterproductive features of the existing immigrant regu-
152 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A) (2006) (setting five- and ten-year bans on readmis-
sion for immigrants previously deported).  Some deportable noncitizens are eligible 
for a statutory alternative to deportation called “voluntary departure.”  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229(c).  Noncitizens who depart the country pursuant to a voluntary departure 
agreement avoid the collateral legal consequences of deportation and may immedi-
ately reapply for admission.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1229(c).  Often, however, these non-
citizens cannot qualify for any of the employment-, family-, or refugee-related grounds 
of admission.  And recent changes in the law have made voluntary departure a less at-
tractive option for noncitizens.  See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 20, at 820-21. 
153 What I term “temporary deportation” is quite different from any existing rule 
in American immigration law.  It is true that, under the current system, some nonciti-
zens have the right to reapply for admission after a period of time.  Nonetheless, the 
right to reapply still requires the noncitizen (1) to come within one of the grounds of 
admissibility (such as the family- or employment-related grounds); (2) to fit within 
whatever applicable quotas might limit their eligibility for admission; and (3) to not be 
deemed inadmissible.  As a formal matter, therefore, they have no legal right to reen-
ter.  And as a practical matter, reapplying for admission will often be futile because the 
basis of a noncitizen’s prior deportation often constitutes a ground of inadmissibility.  
Temporary deportation would flip the legal entitlement at the end of the temporary 
period and accord the noncitizen the right to reenter.  In many cases this would lead 
to dramatically different consequences. 
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latory system—such as the fact that there is little bargaining in mod-
ern deportation proceedings, relative to the bargaining that occurs in 
the criminal justice system, because deportation is a largely binary 
rather than graduated sanction.154  Regardless of the ultimate evalua-
tion of these options, it is difficult to begin to imagine these possibili-
ties until we discard the close association of the concept of deporta-
tion with the concept of selection. 
CONCLUSION
For over a century, immigration law has resisted the norms that 
apply to most of our domestic legal system.  Immigration scholarship 
has similarly been segregated from much of the contemporary public-
law discourse.  Both of these trends have been driven in part by the 
idea that the process of selecting immigrants is exceptional.  This Ar-
ticle has argued against immigration exceptionalism.  The process of 
selecting immigrants is deeply and irrevocably intertwined with the 
process of regulating their daily lives.  Recognizing that fact reorgan-
izes a variety of prominent modern debates about the structure of 
immigration law both in and out of the courts.  While this Article can-
not hope to resolve those debates, it does aim to provide a new path 
for future conversation about these difficult constitutional and moral 
questions. 
154 This is an important problem in immigration law today.  The existing immigra-
tion adjudication system has been widely criticized by scholars, jurists, and advocates.  
See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671 
(2007) (suggesting that the skepticism of Judge Posner and others towards immigra-
tion courts may reflect either a nondelegation norm or dissatisfaction with the quality 
of agency decision making).  Most of these critics have advocated internal reforms to 
improve the system.  They have argued for things like more-qualified immigration 
judges or appointed counsel for immigrants in removal proceedings.  These sugges-
tions are valuable, but they overlook another avenue of improvement:  external 
changes to the structure of immigration law that reduce the burden on the system of 
immigration adjudication.  Making changes that promote the bargained resolution of 
a much higher fraction of immigration cases is one way to reduce this burden. 
